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ABSTRACT 
 
The revolving door of the state and federal prison system may be the most persistent 
challenge faced by criminological practitioners and scholars. Following release from 
custody, the majority of former prisoners end up back in the system within three years, 
suggesting that correctional involvement is not an isolated incident for most offenders. 
Through its analysis of parole violations and sanctions, the current dissertation project 
offers important new insights on this “revolving door” between prisons and high-risk 
communities. To do so, each of three empirical chapters looks at a different phase in the 
cycle of recidivism: offending behavior, institutional responses to offending behavior, 
and the consequences of institutional sanctions for offenders’ well-being. The first 
analytic chapter examines how geographical proximity to social service providers is 
related to the risk of recidivism. The findings suggest that the observed impact of 
contextual conditions on recidivism depends on how expansively one defines the 
“community” in which parolees are embedded and further demonstrates the importance 
of capturing the effect of service accessibility on offending behavior within the larger 
ecological context of where parolees live. The second analytic chapter explores how 
“supervision regimes,” the legal, political, and cultural factors that shape the way 
supervision is practiced across jurisdictions, influence the risk of recidivism. The analysis 
demonstrates that regional and county-level attributes shape local templates for decision-
making among parole officers in ways that affect not only whether parolees are revoked 
to prison, but also the use of alternative sanctions, such as stricter community supervision 
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and incarceration in short-term correctional facilities such as jails or detention centers. 
The final analytic chapter offers a rigorous assessment of the causal impact of 
incarceration on labor market outcomes through an examination of whether return to 
short-term custody interferes with the ability of parolees to find and maintain work. 
Findings indicate that the experience of short-term re-incarceration dramatically increases 
the risk of unemployment among parolees in the months during and following their 
incarceration. Taken as a whole, the analyses shed light on how offending behavior, 
institutional decision-making, and the experience of incarceration combine to perpetuate 
the cycle of recidivism.
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
 
The last four decades have been characterized by a dramatic increase in the number of 
people incarcerated in jails and prisons in the United States. Since the early 1970s, the 
rate of incarceration has more than quintupled, with over 2.2 million individuals currently 
behind bars (National Research Council, 2013). Although almost all of these people will 
eventually return home from custody, the majority will end up back in the system within 
three years of release. With over two-thirds of former prisoners experiencing a new arrest 
and one-half returning to prison in this timeframe (Langan & Levin, 2002; The Pew 
Center on the States, 2011), involvement in the correctional system is not an isolated 
incident for most offenders. 
Recent research reports suggest that parole revocation, the return of parolees to prison 
for violating the conditions of their community supervision, is increasingly responsible 
for high rates of re-incarceration among former prisoners (Burke & Tonry, 2006; Grattet, 
Lin, & Petersilia, 2011; Petersilia et al., 2007). Amidst overall rising incarceration rates, 
the return of former prisoners to custody for parole violations represents a 
disproportionate increase in the share of prison admissions. Whereas the incarcerated 
population in the United States grew fourfold between 1973 and 2000, the number of 
people incarcerated for parole violations grew sevenfold (Travis, 2007). The increasing 
reliance on revocation as a standard tool of parole supervision has created a “separate 
path to prison for large numbers of former prisoners” (Travis & Lawrence, 2002, p. 24).  
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Despite the routine use of parole violations and sanctions – collectively referred to as 
“back-end sentencing” – as a means of surveillance and punishment, policymakers and 
reentry scholars are only just starting to explore the contribution of this process to the 
reentry recycling of offenders through the correctional system. In particular, prior 
research has neglected two aspects of back-end sentencing: (1) the contextual predictors 
of violation reports and sanction outcomes, and (2) the impact of sanctions on future 
measures of success. This dissertation advances the literature on reentry and recidivism 
through a three-part examination of these themes. The first analytic chapter examines 
how neighborhood contextual conditions shape the likelihood that parolees receive 
violation reports. The second analytic chapter investigates the impact of county 
contextual conditions on the sanctions issued to parolees for violations. Finally, the third 
analytic chapter asks how the use of custody as a parole sanction shapes the employment 
trajectories of former prisoners. In tandem, these analyses shed important new insights on 
prison’s revolving door and the crisis of mass incarceration. 
A Brief Introduction To Parole Violations 
 
Parole is designed to function as a critical surveillance and rehabilitative mechanism 
for offenders transitioning from prison to the community. Although states differ 
substantially in the extent to which they utilize parole supervision and rely on revocation 
as a control mechanism, the general structure of parole is relatively consistent across 
jurisdictions (Travis & Christiansen, 2006). Upon exiting prison, individuals released 
onto parole are assigned a supervision level that mandates conditions to which they must 
adhere. The supervision level determines how often and in what form parolees must meet 
with their parole officers (for instance, weekly and in person, monthly and by mail, or 
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through electronic monitoring). In addition, supervision typically requires former 
prisoners to refrain from committing any new crimes, remain employed and drug-free, 
keep curfew, support dependents, and reside in specific types of housing. Some parolees 
may receive additional stipulations such as avoiding certain locations, people, or 
employment, or participating in treatment programs (Latessa & Smith, 2007).  
When parolees fail to adhere to the conditions of their supervision by committing a 
new crime or otherwise breaching administrative requirements, their supervising parole 
officer can file a parole violation report that documents the act(s) of noncompliance and 
initiates the back-end sentencing process. Upon issuing a report, parole officers 
determine the appropriate level of review required based on the nature of the violation 
and any aggravating factors in a parolee’s criminal history. Depending on this assessment, 
a sanction for the violation may be issued by the parole officer, the officer’s supervisor, a 
regional manager, or a parole hearing board. Although the small body of literature on 
back-end sentencing has focused almost exclusively on whether parolees are returned to 
prison for violations, parole authorities, in reality, can implement a wide range of 
sanctions. In lieu of returning offenders to prison, for instance, authorities may send 
offenders to lower-security correctional facilities or add more structure to community-
based oversight. Those parolees whose violations result from new crimes or arrests may 
face judicial proceedings to handle the new charges in addition to parole revocation 
proceedings.  
In recent years, the number of former prisoners returned to custody for violating the 
conditions of their parole has increased dramatically. The reasons for this increase are 
twofold. First, the rapid expansion of the prison system has resulted in a vast increase in 
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the number of people exiting prison onto parole supervision, rising from 220,000 in 1980 
to 851,000 in 2012 (Maruschak & Bonczar, 2013; Renshaw, 1982). At the same time, the 
shift from rehabilitative parole practices to more punitive surveillance has increased 
institutional reliance on parole violations and sanctions, with offenders more likely to be 
returned to custody for failing to adhere to their supervision conditions. Over the 20-year 
period starting in 1980, the proportion of prison admissions due to parole violations (as 
opposed to new crimes) nearly doubled, increasing from 17% to 36% (Blumstein & 
Beck, 2005; Travis & Lawrence, 2002). 
Three Stages of Prison’s Revolving Door 
 
Despite the growing number of parolees who are returned to prison for parole 
violations, there has been little scholarly inquiry into the role of back-end sentencing in 
shaping the reentry experiences of former prisoners. The current dissertation project takes 
a first step toward addressing this gap through an examination of how the characteristics 
of parolees and parole offices shape the issuance of violations and sanctions, and, in turn, 
how the issuance of violations and sanctions shape the reentry trajectories of parolees. In 
doing so, the analyses illuminate how local conditions and front line decision-making 
guide post-prison surveillance while also offering broader insight into the implications of 
custodial sanctions for successful community reintegration by former prisoners.  
The project is premised on the idea that the narrow conceptualization of recidivism in 
prior research as a single event – typically a re-arrest or return to prison – has obscured 
the complexity and consequences of prisoner reentry and the revolving door of prison. 
This dissertation aims to more comprehensively explore recidivism as a cycle that 
includes offending behavior, institutional responses to offending behavior, and the 
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implications of those institutional responses on future offender outcomes. To do so, the 
chapters examine the following three aspects of parole violations and sanctions: (1) 
violation behavior and the filing of the violation report, (2) the subsequent issuance of a 
punitive response by institutional decision-makers, and (3) the impact of sanctions on 
parolees’ future labor market outcomes. By conducting separate analyses of violations, 
sanctions, and the effects of sanctions on the same cohort of parolees, the current project 
provides a rigorous investigation of the nuances of back-end sentencing as a driver of 
recidivism. Figure 1.1 illustrates this cycle in its depiction of the process of supervision 
and sanctioning of returning prisoners.  
 
Figure 1.1. Process of Recidivism 
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In order to accomplish this objective, the analyses utilize unique administrative data 
on former prisoners who were paroled from Michigan prisons in 2003. The dataset 
includes records from administrative databases maintained by the Michigan Department 
of Corrections (MDOC) containing measures that span the length of time each offender 
was in prison or on parole. The databases capture data on prior criminal history, 
demographics, marital status, number of minor children, education, recommitments, and 
MDOC assessments of health, substance use, and mental health. The administrative 
records also contain longitudinal data entered by parole and probation officers to track 
information on individuals under supervision, which include all records of parole 
violations and subsequent sanctions. The administrative data on parolees is combined 
with data on contextual conditions and employment outcomes from sources including the 
Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency and the United States Census. 
Using the described data, each of the three chapters explores a different facet of 
recidivism among parolees. In response to recent research suggesting that local context 
can play a critical role in either perpetuating or discouraging recidivism (Hipp, Petersilia, 
& Turner, 2010; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006; Mears, Wang, Hay, & Bales, 2008), the first 
two empirical chapters examine how contextual conditions shape (a) violation reports, 
and (b) institutional reactions to violation behavior. Chapter 2, “The Role of Social 
Service Proximity in Prisoner Reentry” examines the relationship between local 
contextual conditions and the incidence of violation reports among parolees. Drawing on 
support for the role of ecological context in shaping recidivism behavior, this analysis 
specifically asks how social service proximity and other dimensions of local resource 
availability foster recidivism or desistance. The results show that higher levels of service 
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proximity within 30 miles of one’s residence are protective against violation, but living 
within immediate proximity to services increases the risk of violation reports. The 
findings suggest the importance of capturing the effect of provider density on violation 
reports within the larger ecological context of where parolees live and further 
demonstrate that the observed impact of contextual conditions on recidivism depends on 
how expansively one defines the “community” in which parolees are embedded. 
Chapter 3, “Institutional Sanctions in Context: The Impact of County-Level 
Characteristics on Parole Outcomes” builds on Chapter 2 by exploring the impact of 
contextual conditions on the second stage of recidivism, institutional responses to parole 
violations. Building on prior research demonstrating the sensitivity of decision-making 
among front line bureaucrats to local constraints and pressures (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-
Moody & Musheno, 2003), this chapter offers insight into how “supervision regimes” – 
the legal, political, and cultural factors that shape the way supervision is practiced across 
different local jurisdictions – influence the risk of recidivism. This analysis advances 
previous research by examining whether the types of sanctions issued to parole violators 
are shaped by three characteristics of the geographic areas in which parolees are 
supervised: organizational capacity and constraints, institutional culture, and racial threat. 
The results demonstrate that regional and county-level attributes shape local templates for 
decision-making among parole officers in ways that affect not only whether parolees are 
revoked to prison, but also the use of alternative sanctions, such as stricter community 
supervision and incarceration in short-term correctional facilities. 
Chapter 4, “The Effects of Short-Term Custodial Sanctions on Labor Market 
Outcomes Among Former Prisoners” considers the consequences of sanctions on 
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parolees’ reentry experiences by estimating the impact of custodial spells on employment, 
a key predictor of success during reentry (Hagan, 1993; Petersilia, et al., 2007; Sampson 
& Laub, 1993; Uggen, 2000). Although previous research has inferred a causal 
association between incarceration and labor market struggles (Raphael, 2007; Western, 
2006), data limitations have precluded a rigorous investigation into the nature of this 
relationship. This chapter offers a stringent assessment of the causal impact of 
incarceration through an examination of whether return to short-term custody (such as 
jail) interferes with the ability of former prisoners to find and maintain work. Findings 
suggest that both the occurrence and duration of short-term custody have significant 
implications for the labor market outcomes of former prisoners. The experience of re-
incarceration in temporary correctional facilities such as jails or detention centers 
dramatically increases the risk of unemployment among parolees in the months during 
and following their incarceration.  
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. This final chapter summarizes the contribution 
of the three empirical analyses to prisoner reentry research and reiterates the importance 
of deconstructing recidivism into multiple stages. It also reflects on the consequences of 
punitive post-prison surveillance practices for mass incarceration and offers directions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
The Role of Social Service Proximity in Prisoner Reentry 
 
With a fourfold increase in the rate of incarceration over the last three decades, 
approximately 1.6 million Americans are currently incarcerated in state and federal 
prisons (Carson & Sabol, 2012). Almost all of these people will eventually return home, 
generating a cycle of incarceration and reentry in which roughly 1,600 prisoners are 
released each day (Petersilia, 2003). Hindered by low levels of education, few 
employment skills, high rates of mental and physical illness, and the stigma attached to a 
prison record, former prisoners are at high risk for criminal activity and reincarceration 
(Petersilia, 2003; Travis & Visher, 2005). Despite the large-scale implementation of 
reentry programming at the state and local levels, almost 70% of former prisoners are 
rearrested for a new offense and between 40% and 52% of former prisoners return to 
prison within three years of release (Langan & Levin, 2002; The Council of State 
Governments, 2012).  
A growing body of research has highlighted the importance of ecological context in 
shaping recidivism among parolees, finding that individuals who live in more stable and 
resourced communities are less likely to recidivate and be re-incarcerated (Huggins, 
2009; Kubrin & Stewart, 2006). Most studies of the ecological context of recidivism have 
focused on the impact of geographically aggregated social and economic indicators, such 
as the proportion of racial minorities or persons living below the poverty line within a 
given neighborhood or county, on post-prison success. Emerging scholarship also offers 
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some evidence that local networks of service providers may be an important ecological 
consideration in the reentry process (Grattet, Petersilia, & Lin, 2008; Hipp, et al., 2010). 
With extremely high levels of need among former prisoners for services related to 
education, employment, housing, physical and mental health treatment, and mentorship 
(Lattimore, Steffey, & Visher, 2009; Petersilia, 2003), the presence of services not only 
provides opportunities for individual treatment or engagement, but also shapes the social 
organization of neighborhood environments. This article explores the possibility that 
through their impact on local informal social control, collective efficacy, and levels of 
disorder, social services may have important consequences for the recidivism of all 
former offenders, even those who are not engaged in service programming.  
In response, this article aims to (1) understand the spatial layout of social services in 
relationship to former prisoners, and (2) analyze the effects of services on recidivism 
among a large cohort of parolees in Michigan. Reincarceration among former prisoners is 
increasingly a result of criminal or technical violations of parole supervision (Grattet, et 
al., 2011) and, as a result, the current study specifically assesses the impact of social 
services on the incidence of parole violation reports, the administrative documentation of 
such violations. Departing from evaluation research, it asks whether the proximity of 
social service providers promotes parolee compliance with supervision conditions. In 
doing so, it examines multiple scales of geographic proximity to ascertain whether the 
impact of services on parole outcomes depends on the physical closeness of parolees to 
services. The analysis also integrates several other dimensions of neighborhood context, 
including concentrated disadvantage and residential stability, to offer a more 
comprehensive perspective on how community context shapes prisoner reentry.  
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The article proceeds as follows. I begin by laying out a conceptual framework for the 
potential impact of service proximity and local contextual conditions on violations. Next, 
I discuss the literature on the spatial distribution of service providers and the effects of 
availability on consumer utilization. I then briefly review empirical evidence for the 
effects of services and other contextual conditions on recidivism and describe the 
longitudinal and spatially-referenced data collected on Michigan parolees from 
administrative records. After reporting the results, I conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of the present study as well as recommendations for future research. 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Before exploring the conceptual framework for the analysis, it should be noted that 
the outcome examined in this study – the filing of a parole violation report – is actually 
the outgrowth of two highly interrelated processes that are difficult to disentangle: the 
behavior that gives rise to the event as well as the administrative response by institutional 
decision-makers. Prior research on criminal justice system events such as arrests or 
returns to prison have faced similar challenges in theoretically disentangling offending 
behavior from subsequent administrative processes. Since the second empirical chapter of 
this dissertation discusses the theoretical mechanisms involved in the institutional 
handling of parolee noncompliance, the conceptual framework in this chapter focuses on 
the theoretical reasons why contextual factors are likely to affect offending behavior. 
With that in mind, consideration of both offending behavior and institutional responses 
are essential in developing a comprehensive understanding of criminal justice system 
outcomes. 
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Former prisoners have a wide range of needs upon return to their communities. Many 
have low levels of education, little work experience, and substance abuse or mental 
health issues. Following release, former prisoners often struggle to find or maintain 
supports such as employment, housing, mental and physical health treatment services, 
and healthcare (Lattimore, Steffey, & Visher, 2010; Petersilia, 2003; Travis & Visher, 
2005; Visher & Travis, 2003). Local institutions, particularly service organizations, can 
offer critical resources, motivation, skills training, and treatment to former prisoners. 
Although evaluations have not yielded consistent evidence for the benefits of 
programming—potentially a result of poor program implementation or analysis 
(Lattimore, et al., 2010; Lynch, 2006)—research suggests that employment, vocational 
training and work programs, cognitive-behavioral therapy, halfway houses, family 
reunification services, and drug treatment have shown to reduce the likelihood of 
recidivism for some former prisoners (Bouffard, MacKenzie, & Hickman, 2000; 
Petersilia, et al., 2007; Seiter & Kadela, 2003; Zhang, Roberts, & Callanan, 2006).  
Through their influence on local social disorganization, service providers can also 
shape recidivism for parolees who live in surrounding areas but do not participate in any 
programming. The social disorganization perspective asserts that the characteristics of 
neighborhoods – and not just the individuals within them – collectively shape local crime 
and disorder (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 1969 
[1942]). In neighborhoods characterized by stability of home ownership and high levels 
of resources, residents are inclined to form attachments to community institutions, build 
social ties, and establish trust with neighbors (Sampson, 1999; Sampson, Morenoff, & 
Earls, 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). The integration of residents into 
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neighborhood networks, in turn, activates informal social control, the capacity for 
residents to regulate each other’s behavior. Without this self-regulation, neighborhoods—
and their residents—are more susceptible to delinquency (Rountree, Land, & Miethe, 
1995; Sampson, 1985; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002).  
Although there is little theoretical research on the specific effects of service providers 
on social disorganization, a larger body of work articulates how social institutions, more 
broadly speaking, shape informal social control. Institutions are believed to generate 
social ties, engagement, and collective efficacy among residents (Bursik & Grasmick, 
1993; Gouvis Roman & Moore, 2004; Hunter, 1985; Triplett, Gainey, & Sun, 2003). 
Through political advocacy, program development, and community outreach, institutions 
can provide role models and encourage commitment to mainstream values (Peterson, 
Krivo, & Harris, 2000; Putnam, 2000). Institutions also provide employment and 
activities for local youth and adults, discouraging crime that stems from unstructured and 
unsupervised time (Peterson, et al., 2000). The increased foot traffic resulting from the 
presence of business owners and service utilization by non-residents can further facilitate 
informal social control and surveillance by providing “eyes on the street” (Angel, 1968; 
Jacobs, 1961; Peterson, et al., 2000), creating conditions conducive to desistance. 
However, research on social disorganization has also provided evidence for the 
detrimental impact of institutions on recidivism. With more nonresidents entering 
neighborhoods to utilize institutions, residents become less likely to recognize each other, 
feel that they have control over local events, use common spaces, and count on neighbors 
in times of need (Greenberg, Rohe, & Williams, 1982; Kurtz, Koons, & Taylor, 1998; 
Taylor, Koons, Kurtz, Greene, & Perkins, 1995). Taylor and colleagues have argued that 
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every nonresidential address on a block generates a "hole in the resident-based fabric” for 
which residents are unlikely to take responsibility (Taylor, Gottfredson, & Brower, 1981; 
Taylor, et al., 1995). The increased traffic in areas with more institutions may also bring 
physical deterioration, such as litter, graffiti, and wear and tear (Kurtz, et al., 1998), 
which can create the perception of disorder or criminal activity. In turn, such perceptions 
may cause residents to withdraw from neighborhood life and thus lower the capacity for 
informal social control (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; McCord, Ratcliffe, Garcia, & Taylor, 
2007).  
Recent work on the effects of nonresidential land use on crime has bridged these 
conflicting perspectives on the effects of institutional presence on social disorganization 
by suggesting that the impact of institutions on informal control may be conditioned by 
other local structural conditions. For instance, Wilcox and colleagues (2004) have 
theorized that local residential stability moderates the effect of certain types of 
nonresidential land use on crime. The authors speculate that more unstable or 
disadvantaged areas may greatly benefit from the increased supervision offered by 
institutions; indeed, institutions in less stable or resourced areas may make more 
concerted efforts at informal or formal surveillance in response to higher levels of 
neighborhood risk. Alternatively, institutional presence or “business-oriented land use” in 
advantaged neighborhoods may increase the influx of nonresidents, increase discontent 
among residents, and provide opportunities for crime that do not otherwise exist. 
The Spatial Distribution and Utilization of Services 
 
Prior research has documented substantial variation across communities in the 
concentration of social service providers. For instance, impoverished tracts and 
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neighborhoods are often home to higher numbers of organizations that serve low-income 
individuals or families near or below the poverty line (Allard, 2004; Joassart-Marcelli & 
Wolch, 2003; Peck, 2008), while middle- and upper-class areas tend to be characterized 
by more educational services, health services, and children’s organizations (Bielefeld, 
Murdoch, & Waddell, 1997; Wolch & Geiger, 1983; Wolch, Moon, & Lee, 1998). 
However, due to higher levels of local demand, disadvantaged areas consistently have 
lower levels of accessibility across all types of services, meaning that their residents are 
less able to reach and utilize needed resources (Allard, 2004; Allard, Rosen, & Tolman, 
2003; Hipp, Jannetta, Shah, & Turner, 2011; Joassart-Marcelli & Wolch, 2003; Peck, 
2008). 
Variation across space in social service proximity prompts inquiry into the impact of 
spatial distribution on consumer utilization. Prior research has suggested that service 
consumption follows a distance-decay pattern in which individuals are more likely to be 
aware and take advantage of nearby services (Allard, Tolman, & Rosen, 2003; Bielefeld, 
et al., 1997; Kissane, 2003). Proximity to providers is thought to influence service 
utilization through a variety of mechanisms. Both consumers and caseworkers are more 
likely to have information about and trust nearby providers (Allard, 2004, 2007). For 
consumers, the cost of accessing nearby providers is much lower, with research 
demonstrating that people’s willingness to travel decreases exponentially as travel time 
increases (Grengs, Levine, Shen, & Shen, 2010). Individuals with less access to 
automobile transportation, in particular, are more likely to seek service providers close to 
home (Allard, 2007; Allard, Tolman, et al., 2003). Because agencies connect with service 
providers in their immediate area, caseworkers are also more likely to make referrals to 
  16 
local providers (Allard, Tolman, et al., 2003). Underscoring Bielefeld and colleagues’ 
(1997, p. 217) argument that “nonprofit service provision is primarily a localized 
process,” research on service utilization demonstrates that the spatial distribution of 
services plays a critical role in the potential impact of service providers on consumers and 
other local residents. 
Prior Research 
 
Former prisoners return disproportionately to disadvantaged neighborhoods and 
communities where resources and services are already stretched thin (Cadora, Swartz, & 
Gordon, 2003; Clear, 2007). In addition to lower levels of service proximity, 
neighborhoods with high unemployment, poverty and crime rates are likely to have fewer 
overall resources to support the transition from prison to work, exert lower levels of 
social control over former prisoners, and present former prisoners with greater 
opportunities to return to crime (Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001). Despite the 
risks faced by former prisoners living in disadvantaged communities, there has been 
relatively little prior research on the connection between social context and parole 
outcomes, in part because such research requires access to data collected on large 
samples of returning prisoners and records of their violations and sanctions. 
Nevertheless, a small but growing body of literature has shown sizable neighborhood 
effects not only on crime but also on intermediary outcomes that might also affect 
recidivism, such as employment, education, and fertility and family formation (Gephart, 
1997; Harding, 2003; Sampson, et al., 2002; Sampson, Morenoff, & Raudenbush, 2005). 
This research has consistently demonstrated that the risk of recidivism increases for 
parolees living in less resourced and residentially stable areas. For instance, Kubrin and 
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Stewart (2006) analyzed data on a sample of 5,002 former prisoners admitted to 
community supervision in Multnomah, Oregon during a six-month period in 2000, with 
arrest records collected for one year post-admission. They found that the risk of arrest 
was significantly higher for releases who returned to more disadvantaged census tracts, 
using two different measures of neighborhood economic status. In a similar study 
conducted on returning prisoners in Ohio over a one-year time period, Huggins (2009) 
examined data on arrests and parole violations coded from parole agent files. Whereas 
individuals living in disadvantaged tracts had a higher risk of arrest, those living in more 
residentially stable tracts had lower risks of both arrest and violation. Grattet and 
colleagues (2008; 2009) also found that parolees living in disadvantaged neighborhoods 
were more likely to commit technical violations that involved absconding than those 
living in less disadvantaged communities.  
Two recent studies also provided evidence for the contribution of local social service 
providers to desistance among parolees. Grattet and colleagues (2008; 2009) sought to 
learn more about the effects of local services on parole violations among cases heard by 
the California Board of Parole Hearings in 2003 and 2004 (n=254,468 parolees, 
n=114,820 violation cases). A regression model found that parolees with higher 
frequencies of substance abuse and mental health treatment services within 50 miles of 
their tracts were less likely to receive violation reports for minor criminal violations. This 
study provided an important foundation for the analysis of services and offending 
behavior but was limited in its measurement of service proximity. By using a frequency 
measure of services (i.e., the number of service providers within a specified distance of 
parolees’ residential tracts) rather than a density measure, the authors did not address 
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evidence for the importance of consumer proximity to services, wherein closer services 
have a larger potential impact (Allard, 2004; Allard, Tolman, et al., 2003). The 
measurement of services also relied on an extremely large radius (50 miles), arguably 
farther than most clients tend to travel for services (Allard, Tolman, et al., 2003). 
In a similar study of California parolees, Hipp and colleagues (2010) examined 
contextual predictors of being returned to prison among 280,121 parolees released from 
state prisons in 2005 and 2006. Corroborating evidence from Grattet and colleagues 
(2008; 2009) for the benefits of services on recidivism, the authors reported that parolees 
surrounded by higher numbers of service providers within two miles were less likely to 
return to prison than parolees with fewer nearby service providers. Interestingly, in 
contrast to their main findings that services within two miles decreased parolees’ risk of 
return to prison, the number of services within a parolee’s tract or block group actually 
increased the risk of prison return. These findings suggest the importance of testing 
multiple geographic scales of service proximity in order to understand the contribution of 
services to prisoner reentry.  
Current Study 
 
Building on prior research, the current study asks how the ecological context of 
communities shapes the incidence of parole violation reports, focusing primarily on the 
proximity of social services. To explore the impact of local ecological context, the 
analysis tests three hypotheses. Based on evidence that the impact of services may differ 
based on their physical proximity to parolees, these hypotheses are first tested using a 
five-mile radius of service proximity (Models 1-3) and then using a thirty-mile radius 
(Models 4-6). Because the literature does not provide a clear indication of how the effects 
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might differ across different geographic measurements, this paper remains agnostic in its 
expectations for variation across nearby and distant providers. 
The first hypothesis attempts to reconcile conflicting theoretical literature on the 
effects of service proximity on parole violation. On the one hand, institutions can provide 
needed social services, generate social ties and engagement among residents, offer 
employment and activities, and provide surveillance in the form of “eyes on the street”. 
On the other hand, the presence of institutions is believed to create “holes in the resident-
based fabric” such that residents are less likely to recognize one another and exercise 
informal social control. However, a small body of empirical work supports a protective 
effect of service providers on recidivism. 
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of social service proximity within both five 
and thirty miles of parolees’ residences will decrease their risk of parole 
violation. 
 
The second hypothesis broadens the ecological lens by examining the contribution of two 
tract-level variables – disadvantage and residential stability – to the risk of parole 
violation.  
Hypothesis 2: High levels of disadvantage will increase the risk of parole 
violation, while high levels of residential stability will decrease the risk of 
parole violation.  
 
The final hypothesis explores whether these tract-level variables moderate the 
relationship between service proximity and violation, following recent findings that this 
relationship may be conditioned by local ecological characteristics. By serving as proxies 
for local service demand, these contextual variables help shed light on how recidivism is 
shaped not only by geographic proximity to services but also by levels of service 
accessibility. Whereas increased service proximity may create needed surveillance in 
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less-resourced communities, the same degree of proximity may attract non-residents and 
create opportunities for crime that are otherwise absent in more-resourced communities. 
Hypothesis 3: For parolees in more disadvantaged and less residentially 
stable areas, higher levels of service proximity will decrease the risk of 
violation. In contrast, greater service proximity in less disadvantaged and 
more residentially stable areas will increase the risk of violation. 
Data 
 
To address these hypotheses, this study analyzes a unique data set compiled by a 
research team at the University of Michigan of all parolees who were paroled from 
Michigan prisons in 2003 to a residence within the state (N = 11,031).1 The data set 
includes records from administrative databases maintained by the Michigan Department 
of Corrections (MDOC) containing measures that span the length of time each offender 
was on parole. The databases capture data on prior criminal history, demographics, 
marital status, number of minor children, education, recommitments, and MDOC 
assessments of health, substances use, and mental health. The administrative records also 
contain longitudinal data (updated weekly or monthly throughout the parole period) 
entered by parole agents to track information on individuals under supervision, which 
includes all records of parole violations.  
Measurement 
Parole Violation 
 
 To test the influence of service proximity on recidivism, I construct an indicator of 
whether each parolee had a violation within three years of release from prison. I adopt 
                                                
1 This analysis utilizes data from a larger research project (The Michigan Study of Life After Prison) and so 
much of the data used for the current study were collected and cleaned by other members of the research 
team. I use the phrase “the research team” or the collective “we” to refer to the cleaning of data or 
construction of variables resulting from this collaboration. Thirty-three parolees were removed from the 
original population (N=11,064) because they paroled to an address out of state. 
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MDOC’s definition of a parole violation as occurring when the parole agent filed a 
violation report for either a technical or criminal violation. Agents are required to file 
such reports when a parolee is arrested or otherwise charged with a new crime, or when a 
technical violation is discovered. At times, however, parole agents may not file a 
violation report after each discovery of a technical violation. Instead, many agents wait 
until the parolee has committed multiple minor “incidents” (such as failure to report a 
change of residence or a positive drug test) and then condense these infractions into a 
single violation report. Thus, the only reliable way to measure the timing of the violation 
is to use the date of the official violation report. Notably, the database only records 
incidents included in official violation reports, so parolees with one or two minor 
incidents that did not result in a report are not captured by the analysis.  
Service Provision 
 
 In order to determine whether a parolee’s proximity to services affects his/her 
violation reports, I identify and geocode two types of addresses: (1) parolees’ initial post-
prison residential address, and (2) a list of social service providers in Michigan utilized 
by MDOC. Approximately 80% of these providers are drawn from a resource guide 
distributed by MDOC to correctional agents in 2007. The MDOC administration 
confirmed that parole agents largely rely on providers listed in the resource guide for 
referrals. To account for service providers who were utilized prior to 2007 but not 
included in the resource guide, I supplement this list with additional service providers 
retrieved from parole agent case notes.2 The compiled list includes providers offering 
                                                
2 As part of the Michigan Study of Life After Prison, the research team coded parole agent case notes 
between 2003 and 2009 for a random sample of parolees. The case notes included information on all 
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outpatient and residential substance abuse, mental health, educational, employment, and 
sex offender services, among other general supports. Providers included on the list 
typically have contracts or other financial arrangements for services with MDOC and are 
known to be receptive to and experienced with serving parolees. Although the list does 
not represent the entire universe of providers across Michigan, it does include the range 
of providers typically utilized by MDOC parole agents in the course of supervision and 
should be representative of the overall local service environment surrounding parolees. 
Next, I use the mapped addresses of parolee residences and service providers to 
generate kernel density measures of service proximity for each parolee, determined using 
the quadratic kernel function described by Silverman (1986). In contrast to a simple 
frequency count that identifies the number of providers within a buffer distance, the 
kernel density function weighs service providers based on their proximity to each parolee 
with closer services more heavily weighted. To measure potential variation in the impact 
of “nearby” and “distant” services, I create two continuous measures of service 
proximity: (a) the density of services within five miles of each parolee’s first residential 
address, and (b) the density of services within 30 miles of each parolee’s first residential 
address. All distances between parolees and service providers are measured as Euclidean 
(i.e., “as the crow flies”), and all measures are standardized to allow for easier 
interpretation. 
The use of the kernel density measurement has the advantage of accounting for the 
serious differences in utilization between near and far services, which is consistent with 
prior research suggesting that consumers are more likely to know about and access 
                                                                                                                                            
residential service providers utilized during this time, which I retrieved and added to the resource guide. 
See Morenoff & Harding (2011) for details on the sampling of parolees. 
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proximate services. The current measure is somewhat limited by time and data 
constraints in that it is most accurate when proximity can be measured using means of 
transportation and road networks, neither of which are available for the present analysis. 
For instance, Euclidean distances do not reflect actual travel distance via road networks, 
which varies systematically throughout state geography and is highly dependent on 
automobile access. Specifically, short blocks on a grid system in urban settings are 
closest to the circle of Euclidean distance whereas rural roads with long stretches 
between intersections more poorly mimic the circle of Euclidean distance, meaning that 
the kernel density function is likely to overestimate accessibility in rural territory. Like 
frequency counts, the kernel density measure is also limited in that it requires a cutoff 
distance limit. Despite these limitations, the kernel density measure substantially 
improves upon prior research in its ability to capture proximity rather than only 
frequency.  
Disadvantage and Residential Stability 
 
To understand the impact of service proximity within a broader ecological context, 
this study uses data from the 2000 U.S. Census to control for two tract-level measures of 
parolees’ residential context. Neighborhood disadvantage is an averaged scale composed 
of the following standardized tract-level variables: household poverty rate, 
unemployment rate, proportion of households that receive public assistance, median 
family income, proportion of families whose income exceeds $75,000, proportion of 
families that are female-headed, proportion of black residents, proportion of adult 
residents with low educational attainment, proportion of adult residents with advanced 
degrees, and proportion of working adults in managerial professions (where measures of 
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advantage were reversed in polarity). The residential stability of first post-prison 
neighborhoods is an averaged scale composed of home ownership and percent living in 
same household five years ago. These neighborhood sociodemographic factors are 
comparable with those found in similar neighborhood research (Morenoff et al., 2007; 
Morenoff, et al., 2001) and are consistent with the theoretical perspectives on social 
organization, neighborhood effects, and recidivism presented above. 
Other Contextual Variables 
 
In addition to disadvantage and residential stability, the models control for two 
contextual variables that may affect the relationship between services and violation 
reports. First, in an attempt to further account for local demand, tract-level population 
density measures the population density per square mile of land area. Second, research on 
willingness to travel suggests that a person’s likelihood to travel far distances is 
dependent on the size and geographic distribution of resources within his or her region of 
residence (Grengs, et al., 2010). For example, a person living in a sparsely populated 
rural county is typically more accustomed and willing to traveling longer distances to 
meet household needs than a counterpart living in a dense urban core where a range of 
opportunities are nearby. In accordance, the analysis includes an indicator variable for 
whether a person was located in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), defined by the 
census as all counties with a core urban area of over 50,000 people as well as any 
adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic integration with the 
urban core.  
Individual-Level Control Variables 
 
 The analysis controls for three types of individual-level measures that could 
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potentially confound the relationship between service proximity and parole outcomes. 
First are measures of sociodemographic characteristics. Sex is coded 1 for female and 0 
for male. Race is coded as a series of dummies for “white,” “black,” and “other.” Age in 
2003 is measured as a series of dummies for “18-25 years,” “26-30 years,” “31-35 years,” 
“36-40 years,” “41-45 years,” “46-50 years,” and “51-89 years” (reference). Education at 
time of sentencing is measured as a series of dummies for “8 years or less,” “9-11 years 
with no GED or high school degree,” “GED,” “12 years and high school degree,” and 
“some college or more” (reference). Marital status at time of sentencing is measured as a 
series of dummies for “never married,” “married” (reference), “divorced or separated,” 
and a residual category for those who are “widowed, in common law marriages, or whose 
marital status is unknown.” Number of dependents at time of sentencing is a continuous 
variable. Pre-prison employment status is coded 1 for parolees who had any earnings 
during the calendar quarter of prison entry or the preceding quarter (for the prison spell 
that ended in their 2003 parole) and 0 for parolees with no earnings.3 
Second the analysis controls for measures of criminal history and offender status. 
Number of prior prison spells (i.e., an inmate’s “prefix”) is measured as a series of 
dummies for “first prison sentence” (reference), “one prior spell,” “two or three prior 
spells,” or “four or more prior spells.” Time served for the sampled prison sentence is 
measured in years. Type of offense corresponding to most recent prison sentence is a 
series of dummies for “assaultive” (reference), “drug-related,” or “non-assaultive and 
non-drug related.” Sex offender status is expressed as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 
for sex-offenders and 0 for non-sex offenders. Known mental health disorder at the time 
                                                
3 Data on employment status were retrieved through a data sharing agreement with the state unemployment 
insurance agency. Employers report the employment status and earnings for all employees on a quarterly 
basis. 
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of prison intake is coded as 1 for mental health disorder and 0 for no known mental 
health disorder. Substance abuse history is categorized as a series of dummies for “no 
history of substance abuse” (reference), “history of alcohol abuse only,” “history of 
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)/marijuana abuse only,” “history of alcohol and THC abuse,” 
“history of “hard drug” abuse only,” and “history of alcohol, THC, and hard drug abuse.” 
Finally, the analysis controls for characteristics of parole supervision, which are 
measured after release from prison and may influence parolees’ risk of committing or 
being written up for a violation. Early release identifies parolees who were released from 
prison prior to his/her parole date and is coded as a series of dummies for “2000-2001 
release,” “2002 release,” and “2003 release” (reference). An indicator of whether the 
parolee was transferred from prison to a community-based reentry center prior to his/her 
parole date is coded 1 for a center transfer and 0 for no center transfer. An indicator of 
whether the parolee was released prior to his/her parole date and placed on electronic 
monitoring is coded 1 for an early transfer to electronic monitoring and 0 for no early 
transfer to electronic monitoring. 
Missing Data 
 
 Overall, the research team encountered very little missing data from the 
administrative records. In most cases, fewer than one percent of all cases were missing. 
Table 2.1 describes the incidence of missing data, along with descriptive statistics for the 
population (discussed below). To handle missing data, this study uses multiple 
imputation to simultaneously impute all variables and create five imputed data sets (using 
Stata v13 (StataCorp, 2013)). Predictors in the imputation models include all variables 
used in the analysis. The current analysis is performed on the multiply imputed data set. 
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Analytic Strategy 
 
To test the impact of service proximity on parole violations, I estimate two sets of 
nested binary logistic regression models. The first set (Models 1-3) examines the impact 
of nearby service proximity (within a five-mile radius) on the likelihood of violation 
within three years of release, while the second set (Models 4-6) expands the service 
radius by estimating the effect of distant service proximity (within a 30-mile radius) on 
the likelihood of violation within three years. Within each set, the first model tests the 
impact of service proximity while controlling for all individual-level predictors to 
negotiate the conflicting bodies of literature on whether proximate services were 
associated with an increased or decreased risk of recidivism among parolees. The second 
model adds disadvantage, residential stability, population density, and MSA status to test 
whether additional contextual variables could explain the relationship between service 
proximity and parole violation. In response to recent findings that ecological conditions 
can moderate the impact of service proximity on recidivism, the final model includes 
interaction terms between service proximity and tract-level disadvantage, and service 
proximity and tract-level residential stability.4 
Results 
Descriptive and Spatial Characteristics 
 
Descriptive statistics on contextual measures for the population are provided below in 
Table 2.1 (with individual-level control measures reported in Appendix A-1). The 
population is 8% female, 53% black, 45% white, and 2% other (mostly Mexican-
American). With regard to age, a little more than one-third of the population is between 
                                                
4  The analysis was also run in a survival model framework and the results were consistent with those 
reported here. 
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the ages of 18 and 30, another third is between ages 31 and 40, and slightly less than a 
third are over the age of 40. Two-thirds of parolees either attended some high school 
(35%) or obtained their GED (31%), and the majority of parolees (66%) were never 
married. Non-assaultive crimes were the most common offense leading to the prison 
spells that ended in the 2003 parole period (46%), followed by assaultive offenses (29%) 
and drug offenses (26%). For almost half of parolees (48%), the prior prison spell was 
their first incarceration period, suggesting that many of the parolees had not been repeat 
offenders in the past. Nevertheless, rates of parole violation were very high, as 70% 
(N=7,695) of the population committed a parole violation within three years of release.  
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Contextual Measures 
  Population (n=11,031)  # of Imputed Cases 
  
% (mean in 
italics) 
n (SD in 
italics)  % of pop n 
Nearby Service Proximity (5 mi)a 0.00 (1.00) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Distant Service Proximity (30 mi)a 0.00 (1.00) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Disadvantage 0.83 (1.28) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Residential Stability -0.52 (1.06) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Population Densitya 0.00 (1.00) 
 
0.00 (0) 
MSA Status 
     In MSA 0.91 (10061) 
 0.00 (0) Not in MSA 0.09 (970) 
 a Denotes standardized variable 
      
 Figure 2.1 illustrates the spatial distribution of parolees and service providers across 
Michigan. Based on parolees’ first residential addresses, parolees in the 2003 cohort are 
unequally distributed across the state, with 91% of parolees returning to an MSA and 
almost half of the cohort returning to the three-county metropolitan Detroit area. Parolees 
tend to return to census tracts that have higher-than-average levels of disadvantage and 
lower-than-average levels of residential stability (described in Table 2.1). For example, 
after standardizing disadvantage across all tracts in the state, the mean for the 
disadvantage scale in the population of parolees is .83 of a standard deviation higher than 
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the statewide average, suggesting more variability on neighborhood disadvantage in the 
population of parolees relative to the statewide distribution of tracts. Services tend to 
cluster in similar areas as parolees, namely urban and metropolitan areas. Over 70% of 
the service providers in the data are located in MSAs and nearly one-quarter of providers 
are located in the Detroit metropolitan area.  
Figure 2.1. Spatial Distribution of Returning Prisoners and Service Providers 
 
 
Nearby Service Proximity and Parole Violation 
 
Table 2.2 reports findings from the first set of analytic models, which explore the 
likelihood of violation using a five-mile radius of service proximity (control measures 
reported in Appendix A-2). These models ask how the density of nearby services—i.e., 
those within and immediately surrounding parolees’ neighborhoods—affect the log-odds 
of parole violation. Model 1 tests Hypothesis 1 for nearby services, assessing the impact 
of service proximity on violation while controlling for all individual-level predictors. In 
contrast to Hypothesis 1, the results show that higher nearby service proximity is 
associated with an increase in the log-odds of violation for parolees. Based on the 
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coefficients reported in Model 1 in Table 2.2, moving from low to high levels of nearby 
service proximity (one standard deviation below and above the mean, respectively) while 
holding all other covariates constant at their means is associated with a three percentage 
point increase in the predicted probability of violation.  
Table 2.2. Effect of Nearby Services (5mi) on Log-Odds of Parole Violation 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
coef (SE)   coef (SE)   coef (SE)   
Service Proximity 0.07 (0.03) *** -0.02 (0.03) 
  
0.02 (0.04) 
 Disadvantage     
0.02 (0.03) 
  
0.04 (0.03) 
 Residential Stability     
-0.18 (0.03) *** -0.18 (0.03) *** 
Population Density     
-0.10 (0.03) *** -0.12 (0.03) *** 
MSA Status     
0.22 (0.09) *** 0.20 (0.09) ** 
Service Prox*Disad         
-0.08 (0.03) *** 
Service Prox* Res Stab         
-0.04 (0.03) 
 note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
  
  
   Model 2 adds controls for four additional contextual variables: disadvantage, 
residential stability, population density, and MSA status. The findings partially confirm 
Hypothesis 2, indicating that the broader context of parolees’ neighborhoods is 
significantly associated with the filing of violation reports. Parolees who live in more 
residentially stable areas are less likely to receive violations. Tract-level disadvantage, 
however, is not significantly associated with violation reports. With the addition of 
contextual covariates, the relationship between service proximity and violation is no 
longer significant, suggesting that these factors may partially mediate the impact of 
services on violation outcomes.  
Finally, to examine whether the effects of nearby service proximity on violation were 
moderated by contextual factors as laid out in Hypothesis 3, Model 3 includes interaction 
terms between service proximity and disadvantage, and service proximity and residential 
stability. The results indicate that although disadvantage does not significantly predict 
violation in Model 2, it moderates the relationship between service proximity and 
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violation. These findings underscore the necessity of considering the broader context of 
service proximity in understanding recidivism. Figure 2.2 displays the predicted 
probabilities of violation across differing levels of service proximity and disadvantage, 
holding the other covariates constant at their means. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, higher 
service proximity is associated with a significant decrease in the log-odds of violation in 
areas with high levels of disadvantage. However, in areas with low levels of disadvantage, 
increased service proximity is associated with an increase in the log-odds of violation.  
Figure 2.2. Predicted Probability of Violation by Levels of Service Proximity 
and Neighborhood Disadvantage: 5-Mile Radius 
           
 
Taken as a whole, the findings demonstrate that greater proximity to nearby services 
among parolees increases the risk of recidivism. However, the inclusion of broader 
ecological characteristics generates a more nuanced interpretation of the effects of service 
proximity, such that the presence of services in more disadvantaged areas cultivates the 
conditions conducive to desistance, while their presence in less disadvantaged areas 
fosters the conditions that contribute to recidivism. 
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Distant Service Proximity and Parole Violation 
 
To test whether service proximity matters not only within a parolee’s immediate 
vicinity, but also within a wider radius, the second set of models tests the original three 
hypotheses using a 30-mile radius of service proximity. Results are reported in Table 2.3 
with control measures reported in Appendix A-3. Again, Hypothesis 1 tests that impact of 
service proximity on parole violation without controlling for additional contextual 
covariates. In contrast to the first set of models, higher proximity of services within 30 
miles is associated with a decrease in the log-odds of violation. Model 1 in Table 2.3 
indicates that fixing all other covariates at their means, the predicted probability of 
violation for parolees with high levels of distant service proximity is three percentage 
points lower than the predicted probability of violation for parolees with low levels of 
distant service proximity.  
Table 2.3. Effect of Distant Services (30mi) on Log-Odds of Parole Violation 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
coef (SE)   coef (SE)   coef (SE)  Service Proximity -0.14 (0.03) *** 
 
-0.21 (0.03) *** 
 
-0.21 (0.03) *** 
Disadvantage     
0.04 (0.03) 
  
0.05 (0.03) ** 
Residential Stability     
-0.15 (0.03) *** 
 
-0.15 (0.03) *** 
Population Density     
0.03 (0.04) 
  
0.01 (0.04) 
 MSA Status     
0.32 (0.09) *** 
 
0.32 (0.09) *** 
Service Prox*Disad         
-0.06 (0.03) ** 
Service Prox* Res Stab         
-0.06 (0.03) ** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
         The protective effect of services on violation reports is further strengthened by the 
addition of disadvantage, residential stability, population density, and MSA status to 
Model 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, higher levels of residential stability are 
associated with a decrease in the log-odds of violation. Finally, to test Hypothesis 3, 
Model 3 adds the same series of interaction terms included in Model 3 in Table 2.2. The 
results underscore the importance of considering contextual factors in an analysis of 
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service proximity and recidivism. Disadvantage moderates the relationship between 
service proximity and violation; for parolees residing in areas of both high and low 
disadvantage, increasing the proximity of service providers decreases the predicted 
probability of parole violation. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, parolees in highly 
disadvantaged areas experience a decrease of almost ten percentage points in the 
predicted probability of violation when moving from neighborhoods with low to high 
service proximity. 
Figure 2.3. Predicted Probability of Violation by Levels of Service Proximity 
and Neighborhood Disadvantage: 30-Mile Radius 
           
Discussion 
 
With record numbers of people leaving prison, the ability of social service providers 
to help offenders successfully reintegrate and remain in compliance with their parole 
conditions has become central to the reentry process. Engagement with social service 
programs has assisted many former prisoners in overcoming reentry hurdles, yet little is 
known about the ways in which service proximity impacts the risk of recidivism. Using 
administrative data on all offenders paroled in the state of Michigan in 2003, this article 
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examines the relationship between local service proximity and violation reports. I also 
evaluate whether the relationship between service proximity and parole outcomes 
depended on the geographic construction of service proximity. Contrary to expectations, 
the results indicate that high levels of service proximity are not always beneficial to 
desistance, as parolees surrounded by more services in their immediate vicinities are at 
greater risk of parole violation. The results also suggest that services are more beneficial 
to parolees in certain types of neighborhoods. This analysis contributes several important 
findings to the literature on prisoner reentry, each of which I explore in the ensuing 
discussion. 
In contrast to prior findings on the absolute advantages of services, the results 
indicate that higher levels of nearby service proximity (within 5 miles) increase the 
predicted probability of violation for parolees. These findings are consistent with research 
suggesting that high densities of local institutions can generate local disorder and 
decrease informal social control among neighbors (Kurtz, et al., 1998; Taylor, et al., 
1995). Similar to other institutions, organizations that work with former prisoners likely 
generate increased foot traffic in the community as consumers visit and congregate near 
providers. The influx of outsiders—particularly the at-risk populations served by 
providers in this study—may reduce trust and conformity among residents, fostering 
conditions conducive to recidivism.  
Indeed, the models indicate that several contextual variables, particularly residential 
stability, seem to partially mediate the relationship between service proximity and 
recidivism. Because this study does not have access to annual data on service proximity, 
the direction of these mediating relationships are unclear. For instance, the research 
  35 
discussed above suggests that the presence of nearby institutions may itself reduce 
residential stability. Alternatively, it may be the case that the types of providers captured 
by this study are more likely to locate in less residentially stable areas. The literature on 
the spatial distribution of organizations indicates that providers choose locations based on 
a wide range of criteria, including local need, the availability of funding, the location of 
partnering organizations, the existence of appropriate facilities, the supply of qualified 
employees, and the presence of specific client populations (Allard, 2007; Bielefeld, et al., 
1997). The direction of the causal relationships between service proximity and other 
contextual factors is an important topic for future research. 
At the same time, parolees in this study who have higher levels of distant service 
proximity (within 30 miles) have a lower predicted probability of violation. There are 
multiple possible explanations for these findings. Parolee participation with service 
providers may foster the development of new skills, reduce rates of substance abuse and 
mental illness, and provide other necessary supports that encourage desistance. 
Alternatively (or simultaneously), local service providers may offer community-building 
activities, increase local resources, and promote informal oversight of the neighborhood 
by its residents. Thus, services contribute to desistance as long as they are not located in a 
parolee’s immediate vicinity; services close enough to create local disorder or “holes in 
the resident-based fabric” are detrimental to parolees’ post-prison success. It is also 
possible that the presence of local service providers acts as a proxy for other 
neighborhood criminogenic factors not well captured by the contextual covariates 
included in the current models. 
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The results also reveal that neighborhood disadvantage moderates the impact of 
service proximity on parole violations. For parolees living in areas with higher-than-
average levels of disadvantage, the presence of service providers greatly reduces the 
likelihood of violation. For parolees in less disadvantaged areas, service providers located 
within 30 miles also help reduce noncompliance with parole supervision. However, 
parolees immediately surrounded by the highest levels of resources—low levels of 
neighborhood disadvantage combined with high levels of service proximity —experience 
an increase in the log-odds of parole violation. These unintuitive findings are consistent 
with Wilcox et al.’s (2004) speculation that institutional presence in disadvantaged areas 
contributes much-needed supervision; yet institutional presence in better-resourced 
neighborhoods generates disorder and creates opportunity for crime. The present analysis 
adds an important clarification to this theory: in better-resourced areas, the presence of 
services is only detrimental when there is a high level of nearby service proximity. 
Service presence within a broader radius is beneficial for all parolees, regardless of local 
disadvantage.  
In light of this paper’s contributions, it is important to address two limitations of the 
study. While the administrative data used in this study provided an abundance of 
neighborhood, legal and demographic variables on a large cohort of parolees, it was also 
somewhat limited. For example, the data were unable to shed light on the mechanisms 
that shaped the relationship among service proximity and parole violation; i.e., how does 
service proximity impact recidivism? Do the effects of services operate primarily through 
service utilization by former prisoners or through the impact of service providers on local 
ecological conditions? Or, as mentioned in the earlier conceptual discussion, do services 
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primarily shape parole violation reports through their effects on administrative responses? 
The data were also unable to offer insight into potential selection bias between the spatial 
distribution of services and the communities to which parolees returned after prison. 
Parolees’ decisions to live in certain neighborhoods, for instance, may be correlated with 
their risk of recidivism, or service providers may tend to locate in neighborhoods that are 
home to certain types of parolees or characterized by certain structural conditions. The 
current study also utilized time-invariant residential measures, based on parolees’ first 
post-prison addresses. High rates of residential mobility among parolees suggest the 
importance of using time-varying residential measures in future research (Harding, 
Morenoff, & Herbert, 2013) 
A second limitation is this study’s assessment of a single cohort of parolees from one 
state, and therefore the findings cannot be generalized without caution to the general 
population. Michigan’s rates of incarceration, rate of success on parole, and percentage of 
prison admissions who were parole violators were close to the national average during 
this time period (Travis & Lawrence, 2002), yet the experiences of Michigan parolees 
may have differed from those in other states due to sociodemographic, economic, or 
political differences. In addition, criminal justice system policies and practices often 
differ across states. For instance, during this specific time period, Michigan was 
embarking on the implementation of the Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative (MPRI), 
which greatly expanded the services and resources offered to individuals released on 
parole. It is unclear how MPRI’s implementation, which occurred in stages across the 
state, influenced the consumption of services by parolees and the emphasis of services by 
parole agents across jurisdictions. The generalizability of this study’s findings could be 
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strengthened by the inclusion of jurisdictional or organizational differences in the 
surveillance and sentencing of parolees. 
Future scholarship can build on the current analysis by utilizing more fine-grained 
measures of social disorganization and service proximity. For instance, to identify the 
precise mechanisms by which service providers shape recidivism, subsequent research 
can include contextual factors associated with specific aspects of social disorganization, 
such as collective efficacy and informal social control. Case studies or qualitative 
interviews may also shed light on the extent to which former prisoners utilize local 
services as well as the impact of local institutions on residents. While this study focused 
on the overall contribution of services to parole outcomes, future studies should also 
examine the differential effects of specific types of service providers or specific types of 
parolees. Recent work suggests that certain types of institutions may be more associated 
with criminal behavior than others (Slocum, Rengifo, Choi, & Herrmann, 2013), and this 
may apply as well to parole violations. For instance, with such a high proportion of 
individuals involved in the criminal justice system suffering from substance abuse or 
dependence, separately examining the impact of substance abuse treatment on parolees 
may also help refine findings from the current analysis (Mumola & Karberg, 2006). As a 
result, future scholarship should aim to utilize more comprehensive and detailed data on 
service provision. 
The results of this study, particularly when complemented by additional research, can 
offer guidance for the practice and policy of parole supervision. In contrast to common 
wisdom on the benefits of social services, the results suggest that the presence of service 
providers in one’s immediate vicinity can increase the risk of violation, particularly for 
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parolees living in better-resourced areas. From a practice perspective, parole agents may 
consider evaluating a wider range of factors when both approving parolees’ residences 
and pairing parolees with appropriate service providers. To adequately support parolees 
living in more disadvantaged areas, where resources tend to be less accessible, parole 
agents and supervisors may consider implementing additional programming or means of 
accountability to help parolees identify and utilize critical services. For policymakers, the 
results suggest the need for conscientious community planning that accounts not only for 
the existence of service providers and other institutions but also how their impact is 
influenced by broader ecological conditions. 
This study substantively and methodologically builds on prior reentry research by 
identifying the impact of service proximity and the broader ecological context on the 
incidence of violation reports among parolees. Using spatial mapping and multivariate 
analysis, this paper offers insight into how the impact of “context” can vary across 
geographic scale. Future scholarship must continue to investigate how ecological context 
can both contribute to and reduce recidivism among former prisoners.  
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CHAPTER 3  
Institutional Sanctions in Context: 
The Impact of County-Level Characteristics on Parole Outcomes 
 
 
Addressing the revolving door of the state and federal prison system may be the most 
persistent challenge faced by criminological practitioners and scholars. Although some 
states have reported reductions in the past few years (The Council of State Governments, 
2012), the national recidivism rate has remained between 43 and 52 percent for the past 
three decades (Langan & Levin, 2002; The Pew Center on the States, 2011). The social 
and economic costs of incarceration have been widely documented, including negative 
consequences for the individuals who reoffend (for instance, the risk of longer prison 
sentences as repeat offenders, additional family disruption, and labor market detachment), 
their communities, and the taxpayers who bear the cost of incarcerating repeat offenders. 
(e.g., Clear, 2007; Geller, Garfinkel, Cooper, & Mincy, 2009; Wakefield & Uggen, 2010; 
Western, 2006). 
In assessing the current state of research on community supervision and recidivism, a 
panel of the National Research Council (Petersilia, et al., 2007) underscored the need for 
more rigorous research on parole practices and recidivism in general, and particularly on 
the role that local context plays in either perpetuating or discouraging recidivism among 
parolees. Although recidivism is often assumed to be exclusively a result of whether a 
parolee engages in offending behavior, it is concurrently driven by institutional responses 
to offending behavior. As a result, the panel specifically highlighted the need for more 
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research into how the parole system sustains the revolving door between custody and the 
community when it uses imprisonment – rather than community-based consequences – as 
a sanction for parole violations, especially those that do not involve new crimes.   
Responding to this gap in the research on mass incarceration and prisoner 
reintegration, this paper analyzes data on a large cohort of parolees in Michigan to 
examine how local contextual conditions are related to institutional responses to parole 
violations. Specifically, the analysis asks two broad questions. First, how do the 
characteristics of the counties in which parolees are supervised influence the risk of being 
returned to prison for violation behavior, thus perpetuating the cycle of incarceration? 
Second, do local conditions shape the use of sanctions other than revocation, such as 
short-term custody and community-based sanctions? The analysis reveals that the types 
of sanctions issued to parole violators are significantly driven by variation in local 
contextual conditions. Even after controlling for the number and type of violation 
offenses committed, parolees supervised in “risky” areas – such as those with fewer 
resources – experience an increased risk of return to prison, while parolees supervised in 
better-resourced areas are more likely to serve their sanctions in the community. The 
findings also suggest that local conditions play a particularly important role in the use of 
short-term custodial facilities (such as jails) as alternatives to both prison and 
community-based sanctions. 
To provide a framework for the analysis, I first articulate theoretical arguments for 
the impact of local context on the decision-making of criminal justice agents. Next, I 
review empirical evidence for the impact of contextual characteristics on sanctions issued 
to released prisoners. I then describe the administrative data on parole violators used to 
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analyze sanction outcomes. Lastly, I describe the results and discuss the implications of 
the study.  
Conceptual Framework 
 
Despite the considerable authority and discretion held by parole agents in the 
decision-making process, there exists little theoretical research that directly discusses the 
factors considered by agents in issuing sanctions for violations (McBride, 2009; Travis, 
2007). As a result, I turn to scholarship on the decision-making processes of other 
criminal justice system agents and other frontline bureaucrats for insight into how local 
constraints and pressures can shape offender outcomes. 
Decision-making in the criminal justice system has been conceptualized as a function 
of the “focal concerns” perspective (e.g. Huebner & Bynum, 2008; Steffensmeier & 
Demuth, 2000; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006), under which decision-makers balance three 
central concerns: (1) offender blameworthiness (how responsible should an individual be 
held?); (2) dangerousness and risk of future crime (what is the likelihood and community 
cost of an individual committing future crime?); and (3) practical constraints (what are 
the practical constraints and consequences of specific sentences?). Decision-makers 
assess focal concerns within the context of their local “court community,” a “social world” 
composed of interdependent networks of law enforcement, judges, prosecutors, 
community corrections agents, and other system actors (Eisenstein, Flemming, & 
Nardulli, 1999; Ulmer, 1997).  
Within court communities and other direct service bureaucracies, the shared 
workspace, ideologies, and resources among actors are hypothesized to generate local 
templates or “going rates” for the punishment that decision-makers enact for crimes and 
  43 
can create variation in punitive norms across jurisdictions (Eisenstein, et al., 1999; Kautt, 
2002; Lipsky, 1980; Ulmer, 1997; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). In his 
discussion of the socialization of criminal court personnel, Emerson (1983) illustrates the 
impact of local culture on decision-making: “As the prosecutors became integrated into 
local office culture, familiar with its procedures, and accustomed to the shape of their 
caseloads, they came to see and treat offenses that had earlier struck them as ‘outrageous’ 
in more neutral, routine, and ‘lenient’ ways” (p. 434). The decisions of parole agents, like 
those of other justice system decision-makers, may be sensitive to the standards or norms 
that have developed within their local offices or jurisdictions. In this section, I discuss 
three related perspectives on how contextual factors can influence the evaluation of focal 
concerns and issuance of sanctions by parole agents.  
Organizational Capacity and Constraints 
 
The first perspective emphasizes the role that the capacity and constraints of 
organizations play in influencing the decision-making processes of frontline bureaucratic 
agents. Across bureaucratic environments, the “capacity to punish” is highly dependent 
on the availability of organizational resources (Emerson, 1983; Lipsky, 1980; McCleary, 
1977; Pontell, 1984). The prioritization of organizational constraints and maintenance in 
decision-making is particularly vital in overcrowded, under resourced institutional 
contexts such as the criminal justice system (Dixon, 1995).  
Research on judicial sentencing outcomes illustrates the inclination by agents in the 
criminal justice system to align their decisions with bureaucratic resources and needs. For 
instance, offenders who pursue trials rather than accepting plea bargains tend to receive 
harsher sanctions, presumably a response to the higher level of organizational resources 
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utilized for trial (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2001; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). The local 
availability of jail and prison space has also shown to impact the judicial use of 
incarceration, with offenders in under-resourced, overcrowded jurisdictions less likely to 
receive custodial penalties (Clear, Harris, & Baird, 1992; Johnson, 2006; Lin, Grattet, & 
Petersilia, 2010; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  
Evidence for the impact of local resources on decision-making suggests that the local 
availability of alternatives-to-incarceration may reduce the reliance on custody by 
shaping how agents evaluate focal concerns and subsequently respond to parole violators. 
Agents who work in jurisdictions with more available social service providers, for 
instance, are inherently provided more options in the sanction process. Rather than being 
limited to custodial facilities, these agents have the option of utilizing social services 
rather than—or at least ahead of—incarceration (Grattet, et al., 2008; Grattet, et al., 
2009). The presence of service providers might also create a local culture of service 
utilization, with agents in these areas more likely to believe that offenders deserve the 
opportunity for treatment. Recent research has also found that criminal justice system 
decision-makers view offenders from service-poor or otherwise disadvantaged 
communities as unreliable, more threatening, and more at risk of future offending 
behavior (Grattet, et al., 2008; Rodriguez, 2013). In turn, agents in under-resourced areas 
may be more likely to issue custodial rather than community-based sanctions to parolees.  
Institutional Culture 
 
Prior research suggests that the sanctions issued to individual offenders can be shaped 
by institutional culture, driven both by local politics and the development of jurisdictional 
standards for punitiveness. Criminal justice system policy and practice are commonly 
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dictated by political party affiliation, with conservative politicians and voters consistently 
more likely to support the increased surveillance and incapacitation of criminal offenders 
(e.g., Davey, 1998; Helms & Jacobs, 2002). These values can translate to frontline 
decision-making through a number of mechanisms. Public opinion has shown to directly 
influence decision-making through the election of partisan judges and lead prosecuting 
attorneys. Communities or regions with more conservative politicians and voters may 
spend more money promoting a “law-and-order” approach and are more likely to fund 
local advocacy groups. On the frontlines, parole agents, managers, and board members 
may share or be influenced by the community’s political values. Like other frontline 
workers, parole decision-makers are likely to interpret discretionary state policies through 
politically-tinted lenses (Fording, Soss, & Schram, 2007; Helms & Jacobs, 2002; Lin, et 
al., 2010).  
The process by which decision-makers across connected agencies construct and come 
to rely upon common understandings of “appropriate” punishments for certain types of 
crimes and defendants reifies decision-making norms. Over time, members of court 
communities increasingly turn to these standards to guide their issuance of sanctions 
(Eisenstein, et al., 1999). The creation of templates for punishment within and across 
agencies in a court community thus shape how decision-makers understand, assess, and 
respond to offending behavior. Under this perspective, individual offenders who are 
supervised or tried in jurisdictions inclined toward harsher punishment would be more at 
risk of receiving severe sanctions than similar offenders who are sentenced in 
jurisdictions with more lenient punishment standards. 
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Racial Threat 
 
Stereotypes of racial minorities, particularly of black populations, as dangerous and 
prone to threaten public safety have prevailed for many centuries (Kennedy, 1997). 
Scholars have argued that the linkages between minorities and crime have become even 
more widespread in the post-Civil Rights era as politics are increasingly racialized and 
the prison system is increasingly enmeshed with the ghetto (e.g., Pickett, Chiricos, 
Golden, & Gertz, 2012; Wacquant, 2001; Welch, 2007). The disproportionate 
incarceration of blacks – and increasingly of Hispanics – has further reified and 
perpetuated stereotypes of minority criminality. Wacquant (2001) has suggested that 
today’s prison system reflects the “solidification of the centuries-old association of 
blackness with criminality and devious violence” (p. 117). 
The association between minority populations and criminal threat has individual-level 
implications, with black and Hispanic offenders viewed as more dangerous and less 
likely to respond to rehabilitation (e.g., Bridges & Steen, 1998; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; 
Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000). Stereotypes about blacks and Hispanics also manifest at 
the aggregate level, with studies suggesting that people perceive higher levels of crime 
and feel more at risk for victimization in areas with higher actual or perceived 
proportions of minority populations (Chiricos, Hogan, & Gertz, 1997; Covington & 
Taylor, 1991; Quillian & Pager, 2001).  
To manage perceived racial threat, members of the majority class enact 
discriminatory policy and develop threat-oriented ideologies, exaggerated stereotypes 
that justify control (Blalock, 1967). Indeed, residents in counties with larger minority 
populations and higher rates of perceived crime by minority offenders support more 
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punitive crime practices (Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004; King & Wheelock, 2007; 
Welch, Payne, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2011). Criminal justice system decision-makers are 
more likely to issue severe sanctions to offenders in counties with higher proportions of 
minority residents, perhaps reflecting stereotypes of such offenders as more dangerous or 
blameworthy (Mosher, 2001; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Black or 
Hispanic offenders living within these same areas may be “doubly” punished for their 
own race as well as the aggregate racial composition of their communities (Bontrager, 
Bales, & Chiricos, 2005; Harris, Evans, & Beckett, 2011; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). 
Although not all studies have found the relationships between racial composition and 
punishment to be significant or attributable to racial stereotyping and the enactment of 
discriminatory policy and practices (Kautt, 2002; Lin, et al., 2010; Pickett, et al., 2012; 
Ulmer, 1997), racial composition is a necessary consideration in understanding the 
relationship between local context and the issuance of parole sanctions.  
Empirical Evidence 
 
In recent years, scholars have used administrative records on large samples of 
returning prisoners to analyze the influence of local context on the punishment of 
offending behavior. Two recent studies examined the effects of tract- and county-level 
contextual conditions on whether parolees were returned to prison for offending behavior, 
either for new crimes or violations of parole. Hipp and colleagues (2010) used data on 
280,121 parolees released from California prisons in 2005 and 2006 to analyze the 
contextual predictors of being returned to prison. They found that higher levels of tract 
disadvantage and social disorder and lower frequencies of social services predicted return 
to prison for new crimes among individuals paroled in California in 2005 and 2006. 
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Using a large sample (N=49,420) of males returning from Florida prisons between 1998 
and 2001, Mears and colleagues (2008) conducted a multilevel analysis of the county-
level predictors of being returned to prison on a felony conviction for violent, drug-
related, and property offenses. Their contextual analysis focused on census-based 
measures of the resource deprivation and racial segregation of counties to which 
prisoners were released, and they found that returning to a more disadvantaged county 
was associated with a higher risk of being returned to prison for a violent or drug-related 
felony conviction (also see Wang, Mears, & Bales, 2010).5  
Another study of California parolees distinguished the impact of contextual predictors 
on offending behavior from their effects on subsequent sanctions by including only those 
parolees who had already been charged with a parole violation in their analysis of 
sanction outcomes (Grattet, et al., 2008; Grattet, et al., 2009; Lin, et al., 2010). Grattet 
and colleagues analyzed all parole violation cases heard by the California Board of Parole 
Hearings in 2003 and 2004 (N=254,468 paroles, N=114,820 violation cases) and found 
that parolees living in counties with higher levels of “punitiveness”—a scale composed of 
political party registration and ballot proposition voting patterns related to correctional 
practices—were more likely to be returned to prison. They also found that the risk of 
revocation decreased for parolees living in tracts with greater social service availability 
and increased for parolees who lived in tracts with higher proportions of black residents 
and higher black unemployment rates. However, the effects of these latter two predictors 
were not replicated in a follow-up paper (Lin, et al., 2010). 
                                                
5 County-level resource deprivation was not significantly associated with property crime, and racial 
segregation was not significantly related to any of the outcome measures. However, the authors also found 
significant interactions for both resource deprivation and racial segregation for subgroups defined by race 
and age. 
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These studies provide evidence for the impact of context on whether former prisoners 
are revoked to prison for recidivism behavior and suggest that contextual factors can 
directly shape institutional responses. However, research also indicates that revocation is 
only one of the responses that parole agents use to manage parole violations (Taxman, 
1995; White, Mellow, Englander, & Ruffinengo, 2011). Many parolees who are never 
revoked to prison experience other forms of sanctions—such as mandated community-
based treatment or short-term spells in jail—that may be consequential to their post-
prison success. The current study attempts to advance prior research by exploring how 
various aspects of context shape the use of these multiple forms of institutional sanctions. 
Current Study 
 
To better understand how institutional decision-making shapes the flow of offenders 
in and out of custody, this analysis examines the influence of local contextual factors on 
the sanctions issued to parolees. Drawing on theoretical and empirical evidence for the 
relationship between context and criminal justice system decision-making, the analysis 
assesses the impact of the three types of contextual conditions discussed above on parole 
sanctions: organizational capacity and constraints, institutional culture, and racial threat.  
The current study sheds light not only on whether contextual characteristics predict 
return to prison among parole violators, but also on whether contextual characteristics 
influence the wider range of sanctions utilized by parole agents. Although parole 
revocation is often discussed as the most common (and most severe) institutional 
response to parole violation behavior, research has suggested that parole agents often 
draw from a wide range of potential options in their supervision of parolees that include 
community-based sanctions as well as short- and long-term custodial sanctions (Taxman, 
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1995; White, et al., 2011). Due to the lack of knowledge about decision-making among 
parole agents, it is unclear whether sanction options are utilized uniformly or disparately 
across jurisdictions as a result of local contextual characteristics. By examining the 
impact of context on three different types of sanctions, the current study advances our 
understanding of variation in the risks faced by parolees. 
The analysis poses three hypotheses intended to illuminate the relationship between 
context and sanction outcome. Following prior research, the first hypothesis explores the 
influence of context on parole agent decisions between revocation and non-revocation, 
expecting that parolees will be at greater risk of revocation when supervised in areas with 
the following types of risk: (1) less organizational capacity and more constraints, (2) 
more conservative political practices, and (3) more racial threat. The second hypothesis 
reconstructs the sanction categories to illustrate the impact of context on decisions 
between custodial and noncustodial sanctions. Under the assumption that custodial 
sanctions are considered more punitive than noncustodial sanctions, this hypothesis 
similarly predicts that parolees will be at greater risk of custodial sanctions when 
supervised in areas with (1) less organizational capacity and more constraints, (2) more 
conservative political practices, and (3) more racial threat.  
The final hypothesis examines whether the inclusion of more fine-grained sanction 
measurements sheds additional light on the relationship between context and post-prison 
outcomes. I expect that the expansion of sanction categories will reveal nuanced 
jurisdictional differences in sanction usage that are masked by the combined categories 
used in the first two models. This exploration highlights how the use of short-term 
custodial sanctions is dictated by context and, given the lack of theory on how contextual 
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factors shape the issuance of specific sanctions, is more exploratory than confirmatory in 
nature.  
Data 
 
To test these hypotheses, this study analyzes a unique data set compiled by a research 
team at the University of Michigan of all parolees who were (1) paroled from Michigan 
prisons in 2003 to a residence within the state, and (2) issued a parole violation within 
three years of their release before any other censoring event, including death, discharge, 
out-of-state transfer, or return to prison for reasons other than an instate parole violation 
(N=7,701).6 The data set includes records from administrative databases maintained by 
the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) containing measures that span the 
length of time each offender was in prison or on parole. The databases capture data on 
prior criminal history, demographics, marital status, number of minor children, education, 
recommitments, and MDOC assessments of health, substance use, and mental health. The 
administrative records also contain longitudinal data entered by parole and probation 
officers to track information on individuals under supervision, which include all records 
of parole violations and subsequent sanctions. The administrative data on parolees are 
combined with several other data sources, described in more detail below, that offer 
information on the local context of parole offices.  
Dependent Variable 
 
To analyze variation in the types of sanctions that parolees receive for their first post-
release violation, this study defines three categories of sanctions. Revocations refer to 
                                                
6 This analysis utilizes data from a larger research project (The Michigan Study of Life After Prison) and so 
much of the data used for the current study were collected and cleaned by other members of the research 
team. I use the phrase “the research team” or the collective “we” to refer to the cleaning of data or 
construction of variables resulting from this collaboration. 
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violations that result in the revocation of parole by the parole board and a transfer to a 
prison or camp.7 Short-term custodial sanctions are defined as occurring when a parolee 
is sent to a jail, technical rule violator center, or other temporary custodial facility as a 
result of the violation but is not subsequently transferred to a facility designed for longer-
term commitments, such as a prison or a camp, and is not officially revoked by the parole 
board. Community-based sanctions refer to any official reaction to a violation that does 
not involve a period of incarceration, including verbal warnings, mandatory community-
based treatment programs, electronic monitoring, and other changes in the level or type 
of supervision, as well as the few instances in which there was no punishment after the 
violation. For violators whose administrative reports contained multiple incidents and 
multiple sanction outcomes, I select the most severe sanction outcome for each parolee, 
assuming that revocation is the most severe and community-based sanctions are the least 
severe.  
Although the MDOC database that records parole violations does not explicitly 
identify a sanction outcome in 41% of cases with violations, I use supplemental data to 
recover information on sanction outcomes for all of these cases. According to MDOC 
staff, parole agents often forget to update sanction outcomes in their database due to the 
time lapse between the filing of a violation and the determination of a sanction. However, 
using additional administrative data that identifies all changes in the location and 
supervision status of parolees, I can observe whether, where, and why parolees were 
transferred immediately following their violation. For example, in one common scenario, 
a parolee is supervised at the same parole office since release from prison. Several days 
after receiving a violation report, he is transferred to a technical rule violator center, 
                                                
7 In Michigan, camps are specific types of prisons run by the Department of Corrections. 
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suggesting the issuance of a short-term custodial sanction. In other instances, a parolee 
might not experience any transfer activity following a violation report, indicating the 
receipt of a community-based sanction. When a sanction outcome remained unclear, I 
cross-checked transfer information with changes in supervision level and individual 
parolee case notes.8 These methods helped successfully identify sanction outcomes for all 
violation reports, resulting in complete data on parole sanctions. Of the 7,701 parolees 
who received violation reports during the study period, 20% were revoked (N=1,535), 
34% received a short-term custodial sanction (N=2,599), and 46% received a community-
based sanction (N=3,567). 
Regional and County-Level Contextual Variables 
 
To assess the sensitivity of decision-making to local contextual conditions, the 
models include five regional or county-level contextual predictors that correspond to the 
region or county in which each parolee’s supervising office is located. Given that court 
communities are typically defined by county lines, much prior research on the local 
context of decision-making among criminal justice system agents uses the county as the 
unit of measurement (e.g., Helms & Jacobs, 2002; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer & 
Johnson, 2004). This holds true for the state of Michigan, where law enforcement, courts, 
and community corrections agencies are largely organized using county boundaries. As 
                                                
8 I utilized the following decision rules in identifying sanction outcomes: first, I examined data on all 
transfers that occurred under MDOC supervision. Transfers were noted in the data each time supervision 
was transferred from one facility or agency to another (for instance, a transfer from a parole office to a jail 
or from one parole office to another parole office). In most cases, information on any transfers that 
occurred between the time of the focal parole violation and any other offending event (such as another 
violation or an arrest) was sufficient to identify the sanction outcome. When the series of transfers 
following a parole violation did not clearly identify the sanction outcome, I cross-checked the transfer data 
with narrative case notes written by parole agents and data on supervision status. Each of these data sources 
offered clarifying information on where parolees were living and being supervised in the months following 
a violation report. 
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such, the county is an appropriate geographic level at which to measure the influence of 
most contextual characteristics on the exercise of formal control. Contextual 
characteristics were obtained from a variety of data sources, described below, and then 
linked to parole offices and then to parolees using state county codes. 
To capture the capacity and constraints of local organizations, the analysis includes a 
regional measure of social service proximity and a county-level measure of 
socioeconomic disadvantage. Social service proximity is measured at the regional level 
using a 30-mile radius from each parole office rather than at the county-level. According 
to MDOC officials as well as theoretical literature on decision-making, parole agent 
familiarity with local resources tends to be based more on proximity to providers than on 
county boundaries. Using a geocoded list of social service providers utilized by MDOC 
agents in the supervision of parolees, I calculate a kernel density measure of service 
providers within 30 miles of each of the 89 parole offices across the state that supervise 
parolees who are paroled in 2003. The kernel density function has the advantage of 
weighting service providers based on proximity (with closer services more heavily 
weighted), thus responding to evidence that caseworkers and consumers are more likely 
to know about and use proximate services (Allard, Tolman, et al., 2003; Bielefeld, et al., 
1997; Kissane, 2003).  All distances between parole offices and service providers are 
measured as Euclidean (i.e., “as the crow flies”).  Each parole office is assigned a kernel 
density measure that identifies the density of services around each parole office and is 
standardized across parole offices to allow for easier interpretation.9 Socioeconomic 
disadvantage is a weighted county average of a tract-level scale composed of the 
                                                
9 Refer to Chapter 2 for more details on the identification of social service providers and the construction of 
the service provider proximity measure. The current analysis was also run using a count of the providers in 
each county, and this measure was not significantly predictive of sanction outcomes. 
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following tract-level variables taken from the 2000 Census: household poverty rate, 
unemployment rate, proportion of households that receive public assistance, proportion of 
adult residents with low educational attainment, proportion of families that are female-
headed, median family income, proportion of families whose income exceeds $75,000, 
proportion of adult residents with advanced degrees, and proportion of working adults in 
managerial professions. The averaged scale is then standardized across counties. 
To measure institutional culture, the analysis utilizes two county-level measures that 
reflect local political values and sentencing patterns. Conservative political culture is a 
continuous variable that measures the Republican share of the two-party presidential vote 
in the 2004 election (data obtained from ICPSR, 2008).10 Judicial sentencing severity 
captures the issuance of prison sentences among a sample of felony and high 
misdemeanor convictions across Michigan between 2003 and 2006 based on data from 
the Michigan Department of Corrections. Using offenders’ background demographic 
characteristics and a measure of the "class" of the offense (i.e., into which sentencing grid 
the offense is classified) as predictors, I ran an individual-level regression of sentencing 
outcomes (prison versus probation sentences). These regressions do not control for any 
variables that could explain county-level variation in the way cases are processed and 
decided. The residuals from those regressions are then aggregated to the county level by 
taking the county mean of each residual. The variable is then standardized across counties 
for ease of interpretation. Finally, to measure racial threat, the models follow prior 
research in using a measure of county-level racial composition, calculated as the 
                                                
10 Data on county-level voting outcomes were acquired from the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research. Fewer than one half of one percent of all votes was cast for candidates other than 
Democrats or Republicans, and so these votes were excluded from the analysis. 
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proportion of black residents to all residents from the 2000 Census.11 
Individual-Level Control Variables 
 
I control for three types of individual-level measures that could potentially confound 
the relationship between contextual characteristics and parole outcomes. First, the 
analysis controls for characteristics of parole supervision, which are measured after 
release from prison for each parolee. Early release identifies parolees who were released 
from prison prior to his/her parole date and is coded as a series of dummies for “2000-
2001 release,” “2002 release,” and “2003 release” (reference). An indicator of whether 
the parolee was transferred from prison to a community-based reentry center prior to 
his/her parole date is coded 1 for a center transfer and 0 for no center transfer. An 
indicator of whether the parolee was released prior to his/her parole date and placed on 
electronic monitoring is coded 1 for an early transfer to electronic monitoring and 0 for 
no early transfer to electronic monitoring.12  The analysis also includes several measures 
that provide a more detailed characterization of each violation report. One set of 
measures characterizes the nature of the incident(s) that led to the violation. This includes 
an indicator of whether the violation was issued for a technical infraction or a criminal 
offense, as well as a typology of the specific condition(s) that are violated in each 
incident.13 To create the typology of violated conditions, I condense the list of 153 
                                                
11 Although the county-level proportion of black residents is not a direct measure of racial threat, it does 
offer an indirect proxy that has been utilized in previous research on the criminal justice system. For a more 
in-depth discussion of the manifestation and measurement of racial threat as it relates to incarceration, see 
Muller (2012). 
12 Michigan’s work release program ended in 2003, with the passage of truth in sentencing legislation 
requiring that the entire minimum sentence be served in prison. Still, some parolees in the 2003 cohort were 
released to reentry centers (and often placed on electronic monitoring) before 2003. In total, 10% of 
parolees (1,122 individuals) were paroled to centers. Nine percent of these individuals entered the 
community in 2000 or 2001, 59% entered in 2002, and the remaining 32% entered in 2003. 
13  The 18 offenders who were simultaneously charged with both technical and criminal offenses were 
categorized as criminal offenders. 
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reasons cited in the violation reports into 15 categories adapted from MDOC’s Parole 
Violation Elements Guide, a document that specifies the supervision conditions under 
which parole agents can issue violations to parolees. Another set of variables measures 
characteristics of the period of time between being released on parole and the issuance of 
the first violation report. This includes the elapsed time (in days) bewteen release and 
first violation, the number of parole infractions documented in the violation report, and 
an indicator of whether parolees were on abscond status at the time of their violations.14  
Second, I control for the effects of individual-level criminal history and offender 
status on sanction outcomes. Number of prior prison spells (i.e., an inmate’s “prefix”) is 
measured as a series of dummies for “first prison sentence” (reference), “one prior spell,” 
“two or three prior spells,” or “four or more prior spells.” Time served for the sampled 
prison sentence is measured in years. Type of offense corresponding to sampled prison 
sentence is a series of dummies for “assaultive” (reference), “drug-related,” or “non-
assaultive and non-drug related.” Sex offender status is expressed as a dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 for sex-offenders and 0 for non-sex offenders. Known mental health 
disorder at the time of prison intake is coded as 1 for mental health disorder and 0 for no 
known mental health disorder. Substance abuse history is categorized as a series of 
dummies for “no history of substance abuse” (reference), “history of alcohol abuse only,” 
“history of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)/marijuana abuse only,” “history of alcohol and 
THC abuse,” “history of “hard drug” abuse only,” and “history of alcohol, THC, and hard 
drug abuse.” 
                                                
14 The absconding indicator refers only to parolees who were on abscond status at the time of their violation 
report. I was unable to measure the prevalence of parolees who were on abscond status at the end of the 
observation period and may have received a violation once they were back under supervision. I suspect that 
this affects only a small number of people since most parolees either received their first violation report or 
discharged from parole by the end of the three-year observation period. 
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Finally, I constructed measures of parolee sociodemographic characteristics. Sex is 
coded 1 for female and 0 for male. Race is coded as a series of dummies for “white” 
(reference), “black,” and “other.” Age in 2003 is measured as a series of dummies for 
“18-25 years,” “26-30 years,” “31-35 years,” “36-40 years,” “41-45 years,” “46-50 years,” 
and “51-89 years” (reference). Education at time of sentencing is measured as a series of 
dummies for “8 years or less,” “9-11 years with no GED or high school degree,” “GED,” 
“12 years and high school degree,” and “13 or more years” (reference). Marital status at 
time of sentencing is measured as a series of dummies for “never married,” “married” 
(reference), “divorced or separated,” and a small residual category for those who are 
“widowed, in common law marriages, or whose marital status is unknown.” Number of 
dependents at time of original sentencing is a continuous variable. Pre-prison 
employment status is coded 1 for parolees who had any earnings during the calendar 
quarter of prison entry or the preceding quarter (for the prison spell that ended in their 
2003 parole) and 0 for parolees with no earnings.15 
Missing Data 
 
Appendix B-1 describes the incidence of missing data, along with descriptive 
statistics for the population (discussed below). With the exception of two variables 
(sanction outcomes and the reason for violation), less than one percent of all cases are 
missing. As described above, the sanction outcomes are filled in with the aid of other 
administrative records. Parolees’ reasons for violation are treated as missing in half of 
cases, where parole agents use generic codes such as “not engage in any behavior that 
                                                
15 Data on employment status were retrieved through a data sharing agreement with the state 
unemployment insurance agency. Employers report the employment status and earnings for all employees 
on a quarterly basis. 
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constitutes a violation” or “must comply with special conditions”. To handle data missing 
on the reason for violation and other variables, this study uses multiple imputation by 
imputing univariate conditional distributions and creating five imputed data sets (using 
Stata v13 (StataCorp, 2013)). Predictors in the imputation models include all variables 
used in the analysis. The analysis reported in this study is performed on the multiply 
imputed data set. 
Analytic Strategy 
 
The analysis estimates three regression models that illuminate the relationship 
between context and post-prison outcomes while also examining how the construction of 
sanction categories influences the impact of context. Following prior research, the first 
model estimates the impact of context on the risk of being revoked to prison following 
violation. This model compares the impact of contextual characteristics on “revocation” 
with their impact on “non-revocation,” an outcome measure that combines community-
based sanctions and short-term custodial sanctions into a single category. The second 
model shifts the analytic lens to the differential impact of context on “custodial sanctions” 
(a combination of revocation and short-term custodial sanctions) versus “noncustodial 
sanctions.”  
Using multinomial regression, the final model offers more nuanced insight into the 
effects of local context by comparing the influence of contextual characteristics between 
each set of fine-grained sanction contrasts: revocation versus short-term custodial 
sanctions, short-term custodial sanctions versus community-based sanctions, and 
revocation versus community-based sanctions. This model provides additional 
information about whether the decision to utilize each type of sanction is based on the 
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availability of local resources, political culture, and racial composition. All three models 
control for individual-level sociodemographic characteristics, measures of criminal 
history and offender status, and characteristics of both parole supervision and parole 
violation.  
Results 
Spatial and Descriptive Characteristics 
 
Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics for contextual-level variables (individual-
level variables reported in Appendix B-1). Contextual conditions are described at the 
county or regional level. Service proximity is standardized across parole offices (mean=0; 
SD=1). Socioeconomic disadvantage is standardized across counties (mean=0; SD=1). 
The county distribution of votes cast for the Republican presidential candidate ranges 
from 29% to 71% with a mean of 54%. Judicial sentencing severity is standardized across 
counties (mean=0; SD=1). County-level racial composition varies significantly, with the 
proportion of black residents ranging from 1% to 42%. 
At the individual level, parolees are more likely to be written up for technical 
violations (78%) than for criminal violations (22%), with violations most often related to 
failure to report for parole officer meetings or mandatory programming. On average, each 
violation report contains 2.82 noncompliant incidents. For one-half of parolees, the 
offense resulting in their 2003 parole is non-assaultive, and prior to this sentence, sixty 
percent of the parole violators had a previous prison spell. Over half of parole violators 
have been diagnosed with substance abuse or dependence. Demographically, the 
population of parole violators is 7% female, 55% black, 43% white, and 2% other 
(mostly Mexican-American). Violators are relatively young, with 37% between the ages 
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of 18 and 30, and also relatively uneducated, with only 28% obtaining a high school 
diploma.  
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Contextual Measures 
 Distribution  # of Imputed Cases 
 
% (mean in 
italics) 
n (SD in 
italics)  % n 
Contextual Measures (N=83 Counties)      
Social Service Proximityab 0.00 (1.00) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Socioeconomic Disadvantage a 0.00 (1.00) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Republican Votes 0.54 (0.06) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Judicial Sentencing Severitya 0.00 (1.00) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Black Residents 0.04 (0.62) 
 
0.00 (0) 
a Denotes standardized variable 
     b Measured at the regional level (30 miles from each of the 89 parole offices) 
    
Context and the Use of Custodial Sanctions 
 
The first two models use logistic regression to evaluate how contextual characteristics 
shape the use of revocation over non-revocation as well as the use of custodial sanctions 
over noncustodial sanctions. Based on a small body of literature on bureaucratic decision-
making, I speculated that parolees would be at increased risk of custodial sanctions – 
typically considered most punitive – in areas with (1) less organizational capacity and 
more constraints, (2) more conservative political values, and (3) higher levels of racial 
threat. The results suggest that regional and county-level characteristics are significantly 
associated with sanction outcomes among parole violators but that the traditional binary 
categorization of sanction categories may mask more fine-grained influences of context 
on the types of sanctions utilized by parole agents. 
The Decision Between Revocation and Non-Revocation 
 
Table 3.2 displays results from the first two models (coefficients for individual-level 
controls reported in Appendix B-2). The first model estimates the impact of contextual 
characteristics on the use of revocation. The model shows that organizational capacity 
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and constraints are partially predictive of revocation, with higher levels of county-level 
socioeconomic disadvantage associated with an increase in the likelihood of revocation to 
prison over other forms of sanctions. As parolees move from low to high levels of local 
socioeconomic disadvantage (one standard deviation below and above the mean, 
respectively), the predicted probability of being revoked to prison increases 
approximately three percentage points. The proximity of service providers within 30 
miles is not significantly related to the likelihood of revocation.  
The model also examines the impact of two different measures of institutional culture. 
The results demonstrate that neither the percentage of Republican votes in the 2004 
presidential election nor the severity of judicial sentencing affect the log-odds of being 
revoked. However, the likelihood of revocation increases significantly in areas with 
higher concentrations of black residents, suggesting that racial threat is an important 
determinant of institutional decision-making regarding the issuance of revocations for 
parole violations. In comparison to parolees supervised in areas with low proportions of 
black residents (approximately 4%, or one standard deviation below the mean), parolees 
supervised in areas with high proportions of black residents (approximately 36%, or one 
standard deviation above the mean), are over 10 percentage points more likely to be 
revoked to prison. 
The Decision Between Custodial Sanctions and Non-Custodial Sanctions 
 
The second model explores whether the reconstruction of sanction categories further 
illuminates the observed effects of contextual characteristics on sanction outcomes. 
Indeed, a comparison of results from the first two models suggests that contextual 
characteristics do not shape the use of “more” or “less” punitive sanctions in a consistent 
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fashion. In contrast to the first model, the measures of organizational capacity and 
constraints exert a significant negative influence on the likelihood of receiving a custodial 
sanction, with greater service proximity and higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage 
decreasing the risk of custodial sanctions. Also in contrast to the first model, the impact 
of institutional culture on sanctions is significant and negative, with a lower likelihood of 
custodial sanctions among parolees supervised in conservative contexts. Racial 
composition is not significantly associated with the risk of receiving a custodial sanction. 
Overall, these findings are inconsistent with the stated hypotheses, which expected that 
context would influence the use of revocations over non-revocations in a similar fashion 
to the use of custodial sanctions over non-custodial sanctions.  
Table 3.2. Impact of Context on the Log-Odds of Binary Sanction Outcomes 
  Model 1  Model 2 
 Rev v. Non Rev  Cust v. Non Cust 
 (N=1535 v. N=6166)  (N=4134 v. N=3567) 
 
coef (SE)   coef (SE)  
Social Service Proximity -0.15 (0.10) 
  
-0.15 (0.07) ** 
Socioeconomic Disadvantage 0.13 (0.07) **  -0.11 (0.05) ** 
Republican Votes 0.26 (0.70) 
  
-1.74 (0.47) *** 
Judicial Sentencing Severity 0.01 (0.48)˄ 
  
-0.15 (0.03) *** 
Black Residents 2.77 (0.91) ***  -0.38 (0.61)  note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        ˄ The coefficient and standard error for this term have each been multiplied by 10   
 
Context and the Use of Fine-Grained Sanction Outcomes 
 
Table 3.3 displays the results of the next three models, which expand the construction 
of sanction outcomes to three distinct forms of sanctions: revocation, short-term custodial 
sanctions, and community-based sanctions (individual-level controls reported in 
Appendix B-3). The findings reported here suggest that this expansion is critical to 
understanding the unique impact of context on how parolees are sanctioned for parole 
violations, as the risk of each sanction type varies significantly based on jurisdictional 
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characteristics. Most notably, the impact of context on the utilization of short-term 
custodial sanctions appears to operate differently than its impact on revocation and 
community-based sanctions, a finding that sheds light on the seemingly inconsistent 
results observed earlier in Models 1 and 2.16 
The Decision to Use Short-Term Custodial Sanctions 
 
In comparison to revocation and community-based sanctions, the likelihood of 
receiving a short-term custodial sanction decreases for parolees supervised in areas with 
more proximate social services, higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, more 
conservative politics and judicial practices, and a greater proportion of black residents. 
These findings are significant across nine out of the ten estimates that involve short-term 
custodial sanctions (Models 3a and 3b), suggesting that jurisdictional characteristics play 
a central role in the issuance of short-term custodial sanctions to parole violators. The 
magnitude of the decreased risk of short-term custodial sanctions is particularly strong in 
counties with sizeable black populations and conservative voters. For instance, in 
comparison to parolees supervised in counties with a low percentage of residents voting 
Republican in the 2004 Presidential election (31%, or one standard deviation below the 
mean), parolees supervised in counties with a higher percentage of Republican voters 
(54%, one standard deviation above the mean) were 10 percentage points less likely to 
receive short-term custodial sanctions in comparison to revocation and community-based 
                                                
16 Arguably, the types of sanctions issued to parole violators should differ considerably based on the type of 
violation committed. To handle this issue, all reported models controlled for whether each violation was a 
technical infraction or a criminal offense, as well as the more specific type of violation behavior. In 
addition, ancillary analyses (not reported) stratified by type of offense (technical versus criminal) revealed 
that the impact of context on sanction outcome was comparable across types of offenses, though the effect 
sizes for criminal violations were, on average, larger than for technical violations. Ancillary analyses also 
explored residential tract-level disadvantage and residential stability as possible sources of confounding 
and found that their inclusion did not alter the results. 
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sanctions. Taken as a whole, these estimates potentially suggest a lack of short-term 
custodial sanction facilities in certain areas or reluctance among parole officers in more 
conservative and disadvantaged counties to utilize short-term custodial sanctions. 
Table 3.3. Impact of Context on the Log-Odds of Fine-Grained Sanction Outcomes 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Revocation v. 
Short-Term Cust  
Short-Term Cust v. 
Community  
Revocation v. 
Community 
 (N=1535 v. N=2599)  (N=2599 v. N=3567)  (N=1535 v. N=3567) 
  coef (SE)   coef (SE)   coef (SE)   
Social Service Proximity -0.09 (0.10) 
  
-0.13 (0.07) *  -0.23 (0.10) ** 
Socioeconomic Disadvantage 0.20 (0.07) *** -0.15 (0.05) *** 0.05 (0.07) 
 Republican Votes 1.25 (0.75) *  -1.98 (0.50) *** -0.73 (0.74)  Judicial Sentencing Severity 0.10 (0.05) *  -0.18 (0.04) *** -0.09 (0.05) * 
Black Residents 3.52 (0.97) *** -1.32 (0.65) *  2.20 (0.96) ** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
The effect of county-level socioeconomic disadvantage on sanction outcomes helps 
illustrate the importance of measuring short-term custodial sanctions separate from both 
revocation and community-based sanctions. The first two models presented in Table 3.2 
suggest somewhat conflicting estimates for the impact of socioeconomic disadvantage. 
When revocation is compared to non-revocation (Model 1), the likelihood of being 
revoked in more disadvantaged counties increases significantly. On the other hand, when 
custodial sanctions are compared to noncustodial sanctions (Model 2), the likelihood of 
being returned to custody decreases in comparison to the likelihood of remaining in the 
community. The results reported in the first two models in Table 3.3 make clear that the 
relationship between context and the use of short-term custodial sanctions explains the 
seemingly paradoxical results. In comparison to parolees supervised in areas with low 
levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, parolees supervised in areas with high levels of 
socioeconomic disadvantage are five percentage points more likely to receive 
community-based sanctions and three percentage points more likely to be revoked to 
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prison. At the same time, parolees supervised in areas with high levels of socioeconomic 
disadvantage are seven percentage points less likely to receive short-term custodial 
sanctions. The results of the multinomial models suggest that jurisdictional variation in 
the utilization or avoidance of temporary facilities such as jails and corrections centers 
plays a central role in shaping the parole outcomes of former prisoners who have violated 
their supervision conditions. 
The Use of Other Forms of Sanction 
 
The multinomial models help clarify potential inconsistencies in the first two models 
by illuminating how contextual conditions uniquely shape the use of short-term custodial 
sanctions. By parsing out each sanction type rather than combining sanctions into 
aggregated categories, the final models also offer more precise estimates of how local 
context shapes the use of revocation and community-based sanctions. Several notable 
patterns emerged in the multinomial models regarding these relationships. Echoing 
findings from the binary models in Table 3.2, parolees supervised in areas with a higher 
proportion of black residents experience an increased likelihood of being revoked to 
prison in comparison to all other types of sanctions. In the choice between revocation and 
short-term custodial sanctions, parolees in more disadvantaged and conservative counties 
face an increased likelihood of revocation. On the other hand, also consistent with results 
from Table 3.2, greater proximity of social services appear to reduce the risk of being 
sent to custody, with the likelihood of community-based sanctions increasing in 
comparison to both revocation and short-term custodial sanctions. To summarize, even 
after controlling for the specific violation offense committed by each offender, parolees 
supervised in areas characterized by more “risky” contextual conditions are more likely 
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to be sent back to prison as a result of their parole violation, rather than issued a short-
term stay in custody or the ability to remain in the community. Specifically, higher levels 
of socioeconomic disadvantage, a higher proportion of black residents, and more 
conservative politics increase the risk of revocation. Alternatively, when social services 
are more locally accessible to parole agents, parolees are more likely to remain in the 
community following a violation. 
Discussion 
 
Persistently high rates of recidivism among former offenders have provoked inquiry 
into the role of institutional decision-making in perpetuating returns to custody for 
violations of parole supervision. This article examined whether the sanctions issued to 
parole violators are influenced by the contextual conditions of the parole offices at which 
parolees are supervised. Using administrative data from the state of Michigan, the 
analysis explored the contribution of local organizational capacity and constraints, 
institutional culture, and racial threat to sanction outcomes among offenders paroled in 
2003.  
Most prior studies of parole violations have focused exclusively on the predictors of 
parole revocation, in which parolees are returned to prison for violating the conditions of 
their supervision. Reflecting the broader range of sanctions that parole agents issue in 
response to violations, the current study examined the predictors of three distinct sanction 
outcomes: community-based sanctions, short-term custodial sanctions, and revocation. 
The results demonstrated that regional and county-level attributes shape local templates 
for decision-making among parole agents in ways that affect not only whether parolees 
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are revoked to prison, but also the more nuanced use of short-term custodial facilities and 
community-based sanctions.  
Two central themes emerged with regard to the use of sanctions for parole violators. 
First, the analysis demonstrated that local contextual characteristics play a critical role in 
determining the extent to which parole offices sustain the revolving door between prison 
and the community. As expected, the contextual conditions that are typically considered 
more “risky” – including less resource availability, more socioeconomic disadvantage, 
conservative politics, and a higher proportion of black residents – place parolees at higher 
risk for revocation. These findings are consistent with previous research on the 
relationships between contextual conditions and returns to prison (e.g., Helms & Jacobs, 
2002; Lin, et al., 2010; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). Although this study cannot identify the 
mechanisms by which these conditions increase the risk of revocation, prior research 
suggests several possibilities. In regions with an abundance of service providers, parole 
agents have the opportunity to take advantage of community-based programming and 
treatment options rather than returning parolees to prison. Agents in resource-rich areas 
may believe that parolees will have sufficient supportive services upon reentry, and so a 
longer-term return to prison is deemed unnecessary and perhaps not useful by the parole 
agent. However, in under-resourced areas, parole agents possess fewer options for 
sentencing and may come to rely on prison as the only or most dependable solution.  
Parolees are also at greater risk of revocation in conservative counties with higher 
proportions of black residents. The impact of political opinion may operate through a 
number of mechanisms: the direct effect of residents’ political opinion on election 
outcomes, the passage of government and administrative policy, and the decisions of 
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frontline workers (who often live locally and share local values) (Lipsky, 1980; Watkins-
Hayes, 2009). At the same time, the racial threat theory offers an explanation for the 
positive association between the county-level proportion of black residents and harsher 
sanction outcomes: the general threat posed by higher proportions of minority residents 
results in more punitive responses to violations, a response that aims to maintain the 
racial (im)balance of power. 
A second major theme that emerges from the analysis concerns the use of short-term 
custodial sanctions, such as jail, corrections centers, and technical rule violator centers. 
The inclusion of short-term custodial sanctions in this analysis advances the current 
literature on recidivism and decision-making in the criminal justice system, which has 
largely neglected sanctions other than prison. The results indicate that certain 
jurisdictional qualities considerably reduce the likelihood of receiving a short-term 
custodial sanction in comparison to other forms of sanction. Parolees supervised in 
counties with greater proximity of service providers, more socioeconomic disadvantage, 
more conservative voters, harsher sentencing practices, and a higher proportion of black 
residents are less likely to receive short-term custodial sanctions than either community-
based sanctions or revocation. In turn, counties in which parolees experience a lower 
likelihood of short-term custodial sanctions tend to rely more on both community-based 
sanctions and revocation.  
Prior research and theory offer some insight into these findings, which may reflect 
either variation in access to temporary custodial facilities across jurisdictions or variation 
in the degree to which localized decision-making templates support the use of short-term 
custodial sanctions. First, increased reliance on short-term custodial sanctions occurs in 
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areas characterized by fewer social service providers and less disadvantage. Stereotypes 
of parolees from less disadvantaged areas as less dangerous or not as deserving of severe 
punishment may translate into the belief that revocation is not a necessary safety 
precaution, with short-term custodial facilities providing a more appropriate alternative. 
The more frequent reliance on short-term custodial facilities in less conservative counties 
and counties with lower proportions of black residents may be attributable to similar 
beliefs about the safety and deservingness of local parolees. It is also possible that these 
findings are partially driven by unmeasured organizational or contextual attributes such 
as parole agent caseload size or the availability of bed space in local jails or other 
facilities.  
Evidence for variation in the use of sanctions across jurisdictions has significant 
implications for the reentry success of offenders, the well-being of communities, and the 
effective operation of the criminal justice system. Although there has been little research 
on how parole sanctions impact the future trajectories of offenders, literature consistently 
links incarceration with family disruption, attenuated ties to social services and 
employment, and mental and physical health challenges (e.g., Apel & Sweeten, 2010; 
Geller, et al., 2009; Massoglia, 2008; Travis & Waul, 2003; Western, 2006). 
Communities – particularly those that are already disadvantaged – also suffer from the 
churning of residents in and out of prison. The “coercive mobility” generated by both 
prison sentences and short-term custodial sanctions is believed to break down social 
cohesion and reduce the capacity for informal control among neighbors, contributing to 
conditions conducive to crime (Clear, 2007; Harding, et al., 2013). Finally, the use of 
custodial rather than community-based sanctions for parole violators has critical 
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implications for prison overcrowding and overspending (Burke & Tonry, 2006; Jacobson, 
2005).  
From a policy perspective, insight into the relationship between contextual conditions 
and sanction outcomes can inform evidence-based evaluations of supervision practices by 
policymakers and parole authorities. Local and state-level officials can assess decision-
making by individual parole offices to identify how specific local characteristics shape 
the sanction experiences of parole violators. Understanding the mechanisms by which 
local conditions translate into the greater or lesser use of custody can provide frameworks 
for local reform; for instance, in offices that rely largely on revocation, parole authorities 
can facilitate enhanced relationships between parole agents and local service providers to 
encourage the less disruptive and more cost-effective use of community-based sanctions. 
The findings of this paper also offer support for place-based or community-based parole, 
where agents provide supervision to offenders in concentrated geographic areas. A 
practice that has shown to improve outcomes for offenders and communities, place-based 
supervision allows agents to become familiar with local resources, develop relationships 
with residents, and ultimately provide more locally-informed supervision to parolees 
(Petersilia, 2002; Reentry Policy Council, 2005; Solomon, 2006; Taxman, 2006). 
Although this paper relied on administrative data on parolees released in one year 
within a single state, there is reason to believe that the findings may apply to parole 
practices in other states. At the time of the study, Michigan’s rates of incarceration, rate 
of success on parole, and percentage of prison admissions who were parole violators were 
close to the national average (Travis & Lawrence, 2002). Michigan’s correctional system 
was unique in one regard during the study period: in 2005, toward the end of the study 
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period, the state implemented eight pilot sites (across 18 counties) of a reentry program 
for parolees that aimed to transform the state’s correctional approach to reentry and 
reduce recidivism rates. The Michigan Prisoner Reentry Initiative has been characterized 
by large-scale shifts in pre- and post-prison assessments and programming (Caruso, 
Padden, & Arnovits, 2008). However, exploratory analyses of sanctions for violations 
that occurred after the implementation of MPRI (only 10% of the sampled violations) 
showed that the sanctions issued by counties designated as pilot sites did not significantly 
differ from those issued by non-pilot sites. It is possible that the continued 
implementation of reentry initiatives in Michigan has altered sanction practices, but such 
recent changes are beyond the scope of this analysis. 
The findings prompt several directions for future research. First, the current study 
offers insight into the impact of contextual conditions on parole sanctions but cannot 
provide an empirical test of the theoretical mechanisms by which local conditions shape 
offender outcomes. Future research that more fully explores these mechanisms can 
inform concrete policy and practice recommendations for the oversight of parolees. The 
findings also prompt questions about the relatively low predicted probabilities of 
community-based sanctions for parolees supervised in areas characterized by attributes 
including fewer service providers and higher proportions of black residents. How can 
parole authorities promote the use of alternatives to incarceration among parole agents 
working under these conditions? Qualitative exploration of individual and office-level 
decision-making by parole agents can help identify managerial tools that increase the use 
of community-based sanctions in appropriate cases. Finally, this study takes an important 
step in expanding the range of sanction outcomes utilized by parole agents. Future 
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research should examine an even wider scope of institutional responses to violation 
behavior—such as increased levels of supervision, residential drug treatment, electronic 
monitoring, technical rule violator centers, jail, and other community-based and short-
term custodial options— in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between local context and decision-making in the reentry process. 
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CHAPTER 4  
The Effects of Short-Term Custodial Sanctions 
on Labor Market Outcomes Among Former Prisoners 
 
A broad body of literature has suggested that obtaining employment following release 
from prison plays an important role in the successful reintegration of offenders (Hagan, 
1993; Petersilia, et al., 2007; Raphael, 2011; Sampson & Laub, 1993; Uggen, 2000). In 
response, much reentry research has focused on the labor market experiences of former 
prisoners. This scholarship has painted a bleak picture of employment among this 
population, indicating that the lower rates of employment and wages experienced by 
former prisoners in comparison to their counterparts who have never been incarcerated 
result in a disparity in annual earnings of up to 40 percent (Raphael, 2007; Western, 
2006). Over time, former prisoners are less likely to access jobs that provide 
opportunities for upward mobility, severely slowing wage growth and generating long-
term economic immobility (Lyons & Pettit, 2011; Western, 2006).  
Based on high rates of unemployment and weak labor market attachment among 
former prisoners, prior research has inferred a causal relationship between incarceration 
and employment, arguing that incarceration hinders labor market outcomes through a 
number of mechanisms. For instance, custody spells – especially repeated occurrences – 
may send negative signals to employers about former prisoners’ reliability or 
trustworthiness. Among former prisoners, incarceration may also lead to reductions in 
human or social capital or loss of motivation, both of which can impede the search for 
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formal employment (e.g., Pettit & Lyons, 2007; Raphael, 2007; Western, 2002). However, 
largely due to data limitations, prior research has been unable to adequately separate the 
effects of incarceration on employment from other potential causes of employment 
struggles experienced by former prisoners. As a result, it remains unclear whether the 
association between incarceration and employment is, in fact, causal.  
The present analysis allows for a stringent test of the impact of incarceration on 
employment by using a unique longitudinal dataset of prisoners released onto parole in 
Michigan in 2003. All spells of re-incarceration in jails or other temporary custodial 
facilities and all formal employment outcomes are observed quarterly for three years 
following release from prison. By (1) limiting the analytic sample to parolees who have 
all served time in prison and have at least one prior felony conviction; (2) controlling for 
key factors that may contribute to the relationship between parolees’ short-term re-
incarceration and subsequent employment outcomes; and (3) observing incarceration 
temporally prior to employment, the analysis addresses many of the methodological 
shortcomings of prior research. 
From both research and policy perspectives, the exploration of short-term re-
incarceration is valuable because there is a widespread debate about whether short spells 
of incarceration are overused as sanctions for people who are under community 
supervision. While reentry research has documented the high risk of return to prison 
among former prisoners (Langan & Levin, 2002; The Council of State Governments, 
2012), the literature has largely overlooked the prevalence and impact of short-term re-
incarceration on successful reintegration. The issuance of short-term custodial spells has 
become particularly pervasive in the parole system, with almost half of parolees serving 
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short-term jail sentences and one-quarter mandated to correctional centers or custodial 
reentry programs within two years of release from prison (Harding, et al., 2013). Given 
the high rates at which former offenders cycle in and out of custody, identifying whether 
re-incarceration interferes with the ability of individuals to find and maintain work is 
critical to understanding how system involvement comprehensively shapes employment 
outcomes. 
As such, this paper has two principle objectives: (1) to rigorously investigate the 
causal nature of the relationship between incarceration and employment; and (2) to 
identify whether current policies that support the issuance of short-term sanctions to jails, 
correctional centers, and other temporary facilities are disruptive to labor market 
outcomes among former prisoners. The results offer evidence that former prisoners’ high 
rates of unemployment are at least partially attributable to the experience of re-
incarceration and, furthermore, that even short spells of re-incarceration disrupt success 
in the labor market. The findings raise concerns about the implications of incarceration 
for successful reentry as well as the effectiveness of policies that promote the use of re-
incarceration within community corrections, particularly in response to minor violations 
of parole.  
Prior Research on Incarceration and Employment 
 
Prior studies have focused exclusively on the relationship between incarceration in 
prison and future employment, to the neglect of research on how short-term 
incarceration shapes employment. As such, this section briefly describes prior research 
on the effects of prison on labor market outcomes to offer insight into the relationship 
between incarceration and employment more generally. Causal claims about the 
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relationship between incarceration and employment have been based primarily on 
analyses of survey data and administrative data. Survey research has utilized large-scale 
longitudinal surveys such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) that 
identify periods of incarceration in correctional facilities among respondents. In 
comparisons of respondents who experienced incarceration and those who did not, these 
studies have uniformly reported substantial negative effects of incarceration on the 
earnings and employment of individuals (Freeman, 1992; Grogger, 1992; Raphael, 2007; 
Western, 2002, 2006). Research relying on administrative data, typically from state-level 
departments of corrections and unemployment insurance agencies, has similarly 
attributed reductions in the likelihood of employment and earnings to the harmful effects 
of incarceration (Lyons & Pettit, 2011; Pettit & Lyons, 2007; Sabol, 2007).  
Some scholars have argued that it is not the experience of incarceration itself but an 
array of other factors that are responsible for low rates of employment among former 
prisoners. For instance, the possession of a felony conviction is known to produce labor 
market obstacles, as individuals with felony convictions are restricted from working in 
professions such as childcare, healthcare, private security, and trucking under some 
federal, state, and local laws (Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2004; Kurlychek, Brame, & 
Bushway, 2006). Research also suggests that due to the perceived stigma of a criminal 
record, employers express reluctance to hire candidates with felony convictions (Holzer, 
1996; Holzer, et al., 2004; Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2007) and are less likely to follow 
up post-interview with applicants who have criminal records (Pager, 2003; Pager, 
Western, & Bonikowski, 2009). Other studies have argued that the effects of 
incarceration on employment are spurious and likely attributable to unobserved 
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individual-level factors such as lack of self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) or 
neuro-psychological deficits (Caspi, Wright, Moffit, & Silva, 1998; Moffit, 1993) that put 
individuals at risk for both involvement in the criminal justice system and difficulty 
maintaining gainful employment.  
Due to methodological limitations, prior research that infers a causal relationship 
between custody and future employment has been unable to distinguish the impact of 
spending time in custody on employment from alternative explanations of labor market 
struggles. Previous studies, for instance, have primarily compared incarcerated felons to 
people whose felony record is uncertain (typically missing from the data), and a 
substantial number of these people are likely non-felons. As a result, studies have been 
unable to separate the causal impact of the experience of incarceration on labor market 
outcomes from the policy restrictions and perceived stigma attached to criminal records. 
Most prior studies also compare the employment outcomes of offenders with those of 
non-offenders, generating concern over potentially confounding factors across 
individuals. 
A brief description of one study illustrates the nature of data limitations in previous 
research. Western (2002) follows the incarceration and employment outcomes of 
offenders and non-offenders using longitudinal survey data that capture correctional 
spells in jail or prison among respondents. The study uses a number of statistical 
techniques to help control for the unobserved characteristics of respondents and 
measurement error on self-reported incarceration. However, like other survey-based and 
administrative studies, Western’s (2002) measurement of employment outcomes in the 
aftermath of prison means that any effect of incarceration on employment cannot be 
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separated from the effect of a criminal record on employment, generating uncertainty 
about the causal impact of incarceration. 
Theoretical Mechanisms 
 
The current study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by providing a rigorous test 
of the association between short-term re-incarceration and subsequent employment. To 
do so, it examines the experience of short-term re-incarceration among a sample of 
released prisoners, all of whom possess at least one felony conviction and have served at 
least one prison spell. Given the limitations of prior empirical scholarship on the 
relationship between incarceration and employment, coupled with the lack of theoretical 
research specifically examining short-term re-incarceration, this section explores the 
potential conceptual mechanisms by which short-term re-incarceration among parolees 
may disrupt labor market outcomes.  
From the perspective of current or potential employers, re-incarceration can act as a 
red flag. Current employers may be unwilling or unable to tolerate repeated, extended, or 
unexplained employee absences that result from recurring custody spells (Grogger, 1995; 
Sullivan, 1989). Prior research also suggests that criminal records send “negative signals” 
to employers about the skills or trustworthiness of job candidates (Holzer, 1996; Holzer, 
et al., 2007). For employers who have hired or are considering hiring released prisoners 
despite the negative signals of a criminal record, re-incarceration may heighten concerns 
about employees’ trustworthiness, reliability, or skill sets. The inconsistent engagement 
in the work force that results from repeated custody spells may also raise employer 
concerns about lack of experience or unpredictability.  
For released prisoners, re-incarceration precludes employment during the custodial 
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spell and can also reduce the likelihood of employment following release. Although some 
offenders maintain employment while incarcerated either through in-prison work or work 
release programs (Cheliotis, 2008; Wilson, Gallagher, & MacKenzie, 2001), the physical 
incapacitation caused by incarceration prevents the majority offenders from working 
during this time. Incarceration – particularly repeated spells – may also decrease the 
capacity of former offenders to find employment following release. Incarceration has 
been shown to reduce the human and social capital central to obtaining employment by 
causing workforce detachment and the dissipation of ties to friends, family members, and 
neighborhoods (Apel & Sweeten, 2010; Granovetter, 1973, 1995; Rees, 1966). Although 
the loss of capital is usually attributed to prison spells that remove offenders from the 
community for extended periods of time, it is possible that even short-term re-
incarceration exacerbates this loss, as offenders once again become detached from the 
labor market and need to rebuild already-weakened networks after release. Recent 
research has also shown that custody spells of any length result in substantial residential 
mobility among offenders (Harding, et al., 2013). Such residential mobility may further 
weaken social ties and create spatial mismatches between old job networks and new 
residential communities. Short-term custodial sanctions may also generate contextual 
challenges for parolees, whose post-sanction residential neighborhoods tend to be 
characterized by higher rates of poverty and lower rates of employment than their pre-
sanction neighborhoods (Harding, et al., 2013).  
Even for former offenders who have maintained their social networks during 
incarceration, absence from the labor market can diminish job skills and reduce the 
ability or motivation to function in traditional work environments (Western, Kling, & 
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Weiman, 2001). Recurring custody spells may make it particularly hard for former 
offenders to complete educational programs or feel capable of succeeding in the formal 
work force. Indeed, recent research suggests that much of the nonemployment of former 
offenders results not from unemployment but from labor force nonparticipation, 
potentially due to either discouragement or more immediate or accessible employment in 
the underground economy (Apel & Sweeten, 2010).  
Current Study 
 
The current study offers a rigorous test of the causal impact of incarceration on labor 
market outcomes through an examination of employment among parolees following re-
incarceration in short-term custodial facilities. Through the examination of two broad 
hypotheses, the analysis tests whether incarceration’s occurrence and duration shape the 
likelihood of subsequent employment among former prisoners. The first hypothesis asks 
whether the occurrence of re-incarceration in a short-term custodial facility (such as a jail, 
corrections center, or other short-term institution) is disruptive to employment outcomes. 
Based on theoretical evidence for the implications of incarceration for maintaining a 
current job or seeking new employment after release, this hypothesis predicts that 
parolees who return to custody will experience a reduced likelihood of employment 
during the quarter of incarceration as well as during subsequent quarters. The second 
hypothesis explores the impact of length of time in short-term custody during re-
incarceration on offenders’ employment outcomes, predicting that longer custody stays 
will be more disruptive to employment than brief sentences.  
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Data 
 
To test these hypotheses, this study draws on a dataset of parolees who were released 
from Michigan prisons in 2003 to a residence within the state and tracked for three years. 
From the original 2003 cohort of parolees (N=11,064), a sample was selected using a 
two-stage clustered sampling design in which parolees were clustered within census 
tracts.17 The individual-level sampling probability was set to 1/3, resulting in an initial 
sample size of 3,689. The analytic sample was reduced to 3,532 after dropping 11 
individuals for whom employment information was not available and 146 individuals 
who were excluded from the analysis after experiencing death (N=14) or return to prison 
(N=132) in the quarter of release or the first full quarter post-release. These parolees were 
excluded because they were not in the community for long enough to measure the impact 
of short-term custody on employment over multiple quarters. 
 The dataset combines records from four main sources. First, information on parolees’ 
time-varying residences was collected from narrative electronic and paper case notes 
written by Michigan Department of Corrections’ (MDOC) parole and probation agents. 
Case notes included information on move dates, residence types, and addresses. Using 
multiple coders to increase reliability, every mention in the case notes of a parolee move 
to any residence or custodial facility was entered into a customized data-entry program. 
Second, employment information was obtained from Michigan Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) records, which provided data on all legal employment reported to the state 
government’s unemployment insurance system by employers. Third, administrative data 
                                                
17 Census tracts were first sampled with probability proportionate to their size, and then individuals within 
each selected tract were sampled with probability inversely proportionate to the tract selection rate. When 
the first- and second-stage selection rates are multiplied together, the sampling probability is equal for 
every individual (Groves et al., 2004). This approach also ensures that the final sample size of parolees 
remains the same no matter which tracts were sampled in the first stage. 
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was retrieved from MDOC databases that contained measures spanning the length of time 
each offender was on parole. These databases included longitudinal records of parole 
violations, sanctions, and arrests for individuals under supervision that were entered by 
parole and probation officers. Finally, data on county rates of unemployment were 
retrieved from the Michigan Department of Technology, Management & Budget 
(DTMB), a division of the Michigan State Government (Michigan DTMB, 2009). 
The compounded data were formatted as a person-period dataset that tracked 
outcomes for each parolee for 12 quarters starting in their first full quarter following 
release from prison. Parolee-quarters were censored from the analytic sample for two 
reasons. Individuals who returned to prison custody (either as a result of a new crime or 
parole violation) were removed from the risk set starting in the quarter of their return 
because prison sentences precluded (a) subsequent returns to short-term custody and (b) 
employment for the remaining quarters within the observation period for almost all 
parolees. Parolees who died were also removed from the risk set starting in the quarter of 
death. Deaths were only recorded by MDOC when a parolee died while under MDOC 
custody or supervision, totaling 65 people (approximately 1.7% of the sample) during the 
observation period. The final analytic sample size was composed of 3,532 parolees who 
were observed for a total of 32,191 quarters.  
Key Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Employment. To assess the impact of short-term re-incarceration on the employment 
outcomes of parolees, this study identified the employment status of all parolees in each 
of the 12 observed quarters. Employment status for each parolee was retrieved through a 
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process that matched social security numbers between MDOC and UI records.18 
Although UI records identify employment status by quarter rather than providing precise 
start and end dates, they have the advantage of spanning the entire three-year post-prison 
period rather than only time periods during which parolees were under MDOC 
supervision. A dummy variable was constructed to measure whether a person engaged in 
any formal employment during each of the 12 measured quarters. 
Custody. The analysis is built around predictors that measure the occurrence and 
duration of short-term re-incarceration, which is defined by any residential spell in a jail, 
detention center, residential reentry program, or other custodial facility that falls short of 
return to prison. These short-term facilities, often referred to as “intermediate” or 
“temporary” sanctions, are commonly used in response to technical infractions of parole 
and other minor crimes that do not warrant prison sentences. Custody spells were 
obtained from the narrative residential case note files. Current custody status is a dummy 
variable coded as 1 for any quarter in which a parolee spent time in any of the above 
short-term custodial facilities. Current custody days is a continuous variable that 
identifies the number of total days per quarter spent in any of these facilities. In addition, 
four lagged variables capture the delayed effects of custody on employment. Lagged 
                                                
18 To match parolees with their quarterly employment statuses, all social security numbers (SSN) available 
in MDOC databases for the 2003 parole cohort were sent to the Michigan Unemployment Insurance 
Agency and Workforce Development Agency for matching. In some cases, more than one SSN was 
available for each subject. For 11 individuals in the sample, MDOC had no SSN, so these individuals have 
no UI data and are removed from the dataset. Returned UI records were matched with names from MDOC 
databases, including aliases, to eliminate incorrect SSNs. Approximately five percent of the sample had no 
UI data match their SSN, indicating they never had any formal employment in Michigan between 1997 and 
2010. If more than one SSN that MDOC had recorded for the same person matched records in the UI data, 
project staff selected the best match by comparing employer names listed in the UI records with those listed 
in the MDOC records (from parole agent reports). This procedure resulted in one-to-one matches of 
individual records between MDOC and UI records for more than 99% of sample members. For less than 
one percent of the sample, a single SSN could not be selected after matching on the parolee’s name and the 
name(s) of that person’s employer(s). In such cases, UI data were retained for all SSNs listed in the MDOC 
records for a given individual, under the assumption that such people worked under multiple SSNs. 
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custody status is coded as 1 when the previous quarter (t-1) is characterized by a 
custodial spell. 2-Quarter lagged custody status is coded as 1 when a custodial spell 
occurred two quarters earlier (t -2). Lagged custody days is assigned the number of days 
spent in custody in the previous quarter (t-1). 2-Quarter lagged custody days is assigned 
the number of days spent in custody during a custodial spell that occurred two quarters 
earlier (t -2). 
Control Variables 
 
The analysis controls for two types of measures that may confound the relationship 
between short-term custody and employment. First, models include individual-level fixed 
effects to control for time-invariant differences across people. Second, models include 
time-varying characteristics that vary within individuals across quarters. Each of these 
variables is measured in the lagged quarter in order to capture conditions occurring 
before the measurement of employment. Quarter since first parole captures the number 
of quarters that have passed since the original release from prison, where the first full 
quarter following release is coded as 1. This variable controls for both the amount of time 
parolees have been in the community and also acts as an indirect proxy for calendar year. 
To account for seasonality in employment, I include dummies for specific calendar 
quarters corresponding to each person-quarter record, where Quarter 1 (January-March) 
is set as the reference category. Local unemployment measures the time-varying 
unemployment rate of the county in which each parolee resided in each quarter. County 
unemployment rates were calculated by averaging the monthly county unemployment 
rates in each quarter. Four final time-varying measures act as proxies for other potential 
confounders of the relationship between incarceration and employment related to parole 
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supervision, substance use, and offending behavior. Number of positive substance abuse 
tests is a count variable identifying the number of times a parolee tested positive for 
substances each quarter. Absconding status is a flag that identifies whether a parolee was 
reported as absconding at any point in the quarter. Number of arrests is a count variable 
identifying the number of arrests in each quarter. A final time-varying measure captures 
each individual’s discharge status at each quarter (where 1=already discharged from the 
original 2003 parole sentence).  
Analytic Strategy 
 
This paper hypothesizes that the labor market difficulties faced by former prisoners 
will be exacerbated by the experience of short-term re-incarceration, an increasingly 
common experience among parolees. In order to test this hypothesis, this paper observes 
short-term custody spells and employment outcomes among individuals paroled in 
Michigan in 2003. All outcomes are measured during the first full quarter after offenders 
are released from prison and up to 11 subsequent quarters. 
The logic of the analysis is as follows. The first part of the analysis focuses on the 
occurrence of short-term custody on employment, where custody spells are measured as 
dichotomous indicators of whether the person spent any time in custody during a given 
quarter (results from these models are reported in Table 4.2). Models were constructed in 
a way that (a) separates out contemporaneous from lagged effects and (b) isolates the 
impact of short-term custody (i.e., custody spells that were contained to only one calendar 
quarter). This was accomplished by using the following four-model progression. Model 1 
contains current custody status (quarter t) and its first-order lag (quarter t-1) to help 
establish causal ordering in the relationship between custody and employment. Next, I 
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control for potentially confounding variables to isolate the impact of re-incarceration on 
employment. Model 2 adds time-varying controls that remove variation over time within 
individuals as well as individual-level fixed effects that “purge” the estimates of 
confounding influences from unmeasured factors related to variation across parolees. 
Model 3 adds an interaction between current custody status and its first-order lag in order 
to isolate the effects of custody spells that did not spill over into the current quarter. The 
final model adds a second-order lagged term and interacts it with the first-order lagged 
term to further specify the short-term effects of custody by isolating the cases in which 
someone was in custody during the prior quarter but was not in custody either before or 
after that quarter (i.e., they were in custody during quarter t-1 but not t or t-2).   
The logic can best be illustrated by looking at the equation for the final model, which 
contains both first and second-quarter lags:  
emp_t = b0 + b1*cust_t + b2*lagcust_t-1 + b3*lagcust_t-2 + 
b4*(cust_t*lagcust_t-1) + b5*(lagcust_t-1*lagcust_t-2) + e 
 
Using the above equation, the coefficients can be interpreted using the following 
parameters: b0 is equivalent to the log-odds of being employed in quarter t for someone 
who was not in custody during quarters t, t -1, or t -2; b1 is equivalent to the effect of 
being in custody in quarter t for people who were not in custody in quarter t-1 (regardless 
of their custody status at t-2); b2 is equivalent to the effect of being in custody in quarter 
t-1 for people who were not in custody either in quarter t or quarter t-2; b2+b3 is 
equivalent to the effect of being in custody in quarter t-1 for people who were also in 
custody in quarter t (regardless of custody status at t-2); and b2+b4 is equivalent to the 
effect of being in custody in quarter t-1 for those who were also in custody in quarter t-2 
(regardless of custody status at t). 
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The second part of the analysis uses the same four-model progression to explore 
whether there is a dose-response relationship between the amount of time parolees spend 
in short-term custody during a given quarter and the likelihood of employment in the 
following quarter. In assessing the impact of the duration of re-incarceration on labor 
market outcomes, custody spells are measured as a count variable that identifies the 
number of days someone spent in custody during a given quarter. Results for the duration 
analysis are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
The third and final part of the analysis assesses the possibility of reciprocal causation 
by examining whether employment status predicts subsequent spells of short-term re-
incarceration. Using a series of employment variables that are comparable to the custody 
variables included in Model 4 in Table 4.2, the final model (presented in Table 4.5) 
estimates whether employment in quarter t-1 predicts short-term custody in quarter t. As 
explained above, the inclusion of selected interaction terms allow for the isolation of 
employment, where parolees are employed in quarter t-1 but not in quarters t-2 or t. The 
absence of a relationship between lagged employment and current custody would offer 
additional support that the impact of incarceration in employment is causal and not 
reciprocal.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Figure 4.1 plots rates of employment for the sample of parolees by the number of 
quarters since release from prison. Rates are only calculated among parolees who were 
not returned to long-term prison custody in the three years following release, and so 
quarters that were removed from the risk set following a return to prison (or death) are 
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not included in the calculations. The employment rate rises initially, from 21% in the first 
full quarter following release to 36% in the fourth quarter, levels out in quarters five 
through eight, and begins a slow decline starting in quarter nine. Similar declines over 
time in the likelihood of employment have been observed among former prisoners in 
other studies (Pettit & Lyons, 2007; Sabol, 2007; Tyler & Kling, 2007) and have been 
attributed to the eventual cessation of supervision and reentry services present 
immediately following release or to discouragement with the formal low wage labor 
market and subsequent return to the informal market or criminal activity (Morenoff & 
Harding, 2011).  
Figure 4.1. Rates of Employment Among Parolees Following Release From Prison 
       
 
 This paper tests the hypothesis that the likelihood of post-prison employment will 
be shaped by the experience of short-term re-incarceration and, as such, Figure 4.1 also 
plots rates of employment among parolees based on the occurrence of re-incarceration. In 
comparison to parolees who do not experience re-incarceration in either the lagged or 
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current quarters, parolees who are re-incarcerated are considerably less likely to be 
employed during quarters in which they experience short-term re-incarceration (quarter t) 
as well as the quarters following a custodial spell (quarter t-1). The differences in Figure 
4.1 between the likelihood of employment among parolees who experience custody and 
those who do not indicate that re-incarceration may be an important predictor of 
employment. The descriptive statistics provided in Table 4.1 suggest that short-term re-
incarceration is not an uncommon experience among parolees, who spend time in a short-
term custodial facility in approximately one-fifth of measured quarters. Most of these 
stays are brief, as the average length of time in custody for each quarter is less than five 
days. Table 4.1 also includes descriptive statistics on the time-varying controls used in 
the analytic models. 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Time-Varying Characteristics 
N=32,191 person-quarters % (mean in italics) n (SD in italics) 
Custodial Spells     
Custody Status  0.19 (6013) 
Lagged Custody Status 0.18 (5705) 
2-Quarter Lagged Custody Status 0.16 (5105) 
Custody Days 4.93 (15.97) 
Lagged Custody Days 4.36 (14.91) 
2-Quarter Lagged Custody Days 3.91 (14.22) 
   Lagged Time-Varying Characteristics     
Quarters Since Release 4.95 (3.46) 
Seasonal Quarter (ref=Quarter 1) 
  Quarter 1 (Jan-Mar) 0.25 (8058) 
Quarter 2 (Apr-Jun) 0.25 (8040) 
Quarter 3 (Jul-Sept) 0.25 (8040) 
Quarter 4 (Oct-Dec) 0.25 (8053) 
County Unemployment 0.04 (1.66) 
Absconding Status 0.12 (3720) 
Number of Positive Substance Abuse Tests 0.06 (0.24) 
Number of Arrests 0.05 (0.21) 
Discharge Status 0.27 (8715) 
 
 Time-invariant individual-level measures (described in Appendix C-1) are not 
directly included in the analysis but are accounted for through individual-level fixed 
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effects and, as such, provide a helpful illustration of the distribution of parolees in the 
study. The analytic sample is 8% female, 53% black, 45% white, and 2% other (mostly 
Mexican-American). With regard to age, a little more than one-third of the sample is 
between the ages of 18 and 30, another third is between ages 31 and 40, and slightly less 
than a third are over the age of 40. Two-thirds of parolees either attended some high 
school (35%) or obtained their GED (31%), but just one-quarter graduated from high 
school or had some college education (26%). For almost half of parolees (48%), the prior 
prison spell was their first incarceration period, and over two-thirds of parolees (70%) 
spent fewer than three years incarcerated during the prior prison spell.  
The Occurrence of Short-Term Custody and Subsequent Employment 
 
Logistic regression models were used to estimate the relationship between the 
occurrence of short-term re-incarceration and quarterly employment. Table 4.2 reports 
coefficients for four regression models that identify the associations between current 
custody and employment and between lagged custody and employment. Model 1 tests the 
hypothesis that the experience of short-term re-incarceration will impede the ability of 
parolees to find and maintain employment both during the quarter(s) in which they are 
incarcerated as well as in the following quarter. In comparison to parolees who do not 
experience short-term re-incarceration, parolees who spend time incarcerated have 49% 
lower odds of employment in the quarter of incarceration. The lagged custody effect is 
particularly helpful in starting to establish a causal relationship between custody and 
employment, as it imposes explicit temporal ordering between custody and labor market 
outcomes. Short-term re-incarceration in a given quarter is significantly associated with a 
lower likelihood of employment in the following quarter, as parolees previously 
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incarcerated have 58% lower odds of employment than parolees not incarcerated.  
Model 2 controls for measures that may confound the impact of short-term custody 
on employment outcomes by adding time-varying quarterly measures as well as 
individual-level fixed effects that control for influences from unmeasured factors related 
to variation across individuals. The slight decrease in custody coefficients between 
Models 1 and 2 suggests that variation within and across individuals contributes to the 
impact of short-term re-incarceration on the likelihood of employment, but the impact of 
custodial spells during the current and previous quarters remains significant and large 
after accounting for this variation.  
To illustrate this relationship with the inclusion of both time-varying controls and 
fixed effects, Figure 4.2 graphs the predicted probabilities of employment across different 
combinations of custody in quarters t and t-1. The figure suggests that the predicted 
probability of employment decreases rapidly as custody becomes more prevalent. While 
the predicted probability of employment among parolees who do not experience any 
custody in quarters t or t-1 is approximately 55%, the probability decreases with any 
experience of re-incarceration. Spending any time in short-term custody in the previous 
quarter (with no custody in quarter t) reduces the probability of employment to 45%. 
Custody in the current quarter further decreases the probability to 39%, and parolees who 
experience re-incarceration in both the lagged and current quarters only have a 30% 
predicted probability of employment. Again, focusing here specifically on the 
relationship between lagged custody and employment can offer some insight into the 
nature of a causal association. The 10% difference in predicted probability of 
employment between parolees who do not experience any short-term custody in either 
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quarters t-1 or t (55%) and those who were incarcerated in quarter t-1 (45%) offers 
temporal support for the impact of re-incarceration on future employment.  
Figure 4.2. Predicted Probability of Employment Across Custodial Spells in Quarters t and t-1 
  
Models 3 and 4 in Table 4.2 add interaction terms to the analytic models to more 
rigorously isolate the effects of short-term re-incarceration on employment. Model 3 
builds on Model 2 by adding a single interaction term between current and lagged 
custody. The results indicate that parolees who experience short-term re-incarceration in 
quarter t-1 (but not in quarter t) have 75% lower odds of employment than parolees who 
were not incarcerated. 
Model 4 attempts to further specify the effect of short-term re-incarceration on 
employment by isolating short-term custody spells that lasted fewer than 90 days and 
occurred entirely within the confines of a single quarter. To do so, the model adds a 
second-order lag variable and an interaction between lagged custody and the second-
order lag to Model 3. Referring back to the equation discussed earlier, b2 in this model 
isolates the effect of being in custody only during quarter t-1 when quarters t and t-2 are 
characterized by no incarceration (Q(t-2)=no custody, Q(t-1)=custody, Q(t)=no custody).
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Table 4.2. Effect of Short-Term Custody Status on Employment 
  M1   M2†   M3†   M4† 
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
Custodial Characteristics 
               Current Custody Status -0.70 (0.04) *** 
 
-0.61 (0.05) *** 
 
-0.52 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.52 (0.06) *** 
1-Quarter Lagged Custody Status -0.55 (0.04) *** 
 
-0.39 (0.05) *** 
 
-0.29 (0.07) *** 
 
-0.26 (0.08) *** 
2-Quarter Lagged Custody Status 
            
-0.04 (0.06) 
 1-Quarter Lag*Current Custody 
        
-0.28 (0.11) *** 
 
-0.29 (0.11) *** 
1-Quarter Lag*2-Quarter Lag 
            
-0.04 (0.11) 
 
                Time-Varying Characteristics 
               Quarters Since Release 
    
0.07 (0.01) *** 
 
0.07 (0.01) *** 
 
0.07 (0.01) *** 
Seasonal Quarter (ref=Jan-Mar) 
               Apr-Jun 
    
0.14 (0.05) *** 
 
0.14 (0.05) *** 
 
0.14 (0.05) *** 
Jul-Sept 
    
0.25 (0.05) *** 
 
0.25 (0.05) *** 
 
0.25 (0.05) *** 
Oct-Dec 
    
0.20 (0.05) *** 
 
0.20 (0.05) *** 
 
0.20 (0.05) *** 
County Unemployment 
    
0.06 (0.02) *** 
 
0.06 (0.02) *** 
 
0.06 (0.02) *** 
Absconding Status 
    
-0.89 (0.09) *** 
 
-0.90 (0.09) *** 
 
-0.91 (0.09) *** 
Number of Positive Substance Abuse 
Tests 
    
0.07 (0.07) 
  
0.07 (0.07) 
  
0.07 (0.07) 
 Number of Arrests 
    
-0.02 (0.09) 
  
-0.02 (0.09) 
  
-0.03 (0.09) 
 Discharge Status       -0.81 (0.06) ***  -0.80 (0.06) ***  -0.81 (0.06) *** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                † Includes fixed effects 
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By confining the occurrence of short-term re-incarceration to a single quarter that is both 
preceded and followed by at least 90 days in the community, Model 4 demonstrates that 
the experience of short-term re-incarceration is associated with a 77% lower odds of 
employment in the quarter following custody. In tandem, Models 3 and 4 demonstrate the 
detrimental impact of short-term re-incarceration on employment and offer support for 
the causal nature of the relationship.19 
The Duration of Short-Term Custody and Subsequent Employment 
 
The first part of the analysis sheds light on how the occurrence of re-incarceration 
affects employment but does not offer insight into how employment is shaped by 
custody’s duration. The second part of the analysis examines the hypothesis that 
employment is affected not only by the occurrence of short-term custody but also by the 
length of re-incarceration. This hypothesis predicts that parolees who spend more days in 
short-term custody will have a lower likelihood of employment in the quarter in which 
incarceration occurs as well as the quarter following the short-term custodial spell.  
The results, shown in Table 4.3, suggest that the duration of re-incarceration is 
significantly associated with the likelihood of employment. All coefficients in Table 4.3 
represent the effect of an additional two weeks in custody. The models indicate that the 
likelihood of employment during the quarter of short-term re-incarceration decreases in a 
linear fashion as the length of incarceration increases. The length of incarceration in the 
lagged quarter also shapes employment, but this relationship is non-linear, with the 
                                                
19 The four-model progression was also run using two additional outcome variables: quarterly wages and 
quarterly poverty status, where quarterly wages is a continuous measure of the natural log of total gross 
wages per quarter in 2010 dollars, and quarterly poverty status is a dichotomous indicator of whether a 
person's gross wages for each quarter fall below the poverty threshold for a single person under the age of 
65 (1=in poverty). The findings are reported in Appendices C-2 and C-3. The results demonstrate that the 
experience of short-term custody is detrimental not only to the likelihood of employment but also to total 
wages and poverty status. 
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marginal effect of additional days in short-term custody decreasing over time. Figure 4.3 
illustrates the respective impacts of current and lagged custody on employment outcomes. 
Figure 4.3. Predicted Probability of Employment Across Varying Lengths of Custody 
 
 
For reference, Table 4.3 shows the same four-model progression utilized in Table 4.2, 
but the discussion here primarily focuses on Model 4, which provides the sharpest 
interpretation of lagged custody by confining the experience of custody to quarter t-1. 
Again, by adding interaction terms between the linear and quadratic functions of lagged 
custody and current custody, and between lagged custody and the two-quarter lag, the 
lagged custody coefficient in Model 4 can be interpreted as the effect of custody length in 
quarter t-1 for those people who did not experience custody in either quarters t or t-2. The 
predicted probability of employment for parolees with zero days of lagged custody is 
approximately 54%, and this decreases to 50% after one week, 47% after two weeks, and 
42% after one month. The marginal effects of additional days in custody continue to 
diminish over the course of the quarter. Table 4.4 shows the marginal effects (predicted at 
 97 
Table 4.3. Effect of Short-Term Custody Length on Employment 
  M1   M2†   M3†   M4† 
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
Custodial Characteristics 
               Current Custody Days -0.42 (0.05) *** 
 
-0.14 (0.06) ** 
 
-0.22 (0.07) *** 
 
-0.22 (0.07) *** 
Current Custody Days Sq 0.02 (0.01) ** 
 
-0.04 (0.01) *** 
 
-0.01 (0.01) 
  
-0.01 (0.01) 
 1-Quarter Lagged Custody Days -0.49 (0.05) *** 
 
-0.22 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.29 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.33 (0.07) *** 
1-Quarter Lagged Custody Days Sq 0.07 (0.01) *** 
 
0.02 (0.01) ** 
 
0.05 (0.01) *** 
 
0.05 (0.02) *** 
2-Quarter Lagged Custody Days             
-0.09 (0.06) 
 2-Quarter Lagged Custody Days Sq             
0.02 (0.01) * 
1-Quarter Lag*Current Custody Days 
        
-0.01 (0.03) 
  
0.01 (0.30)˄ 
 1-Quarter Lag Sq*Current Custody Days Sq 
        
-0.01 (0.01)˄ * 
 
-0.02 (0.01)˄ ** 
1-Quarter Lag*2-Quarter Lag 
            
0.02 (0.03) 
 1-Quarter Lag Sq*2-Quarter Lag Sq 
            
-0.01 (0.01)˄ 
 
                Time-Varying Characteristics 
               Quarters Since Release 
    
0.07 (0.01) *** 
 
0.07 (0.01) *** 
 
0.07 (0.01) *** 
Seasonal Quarter (ref=Jan-Mar) 
               Apr-Jun 
    
0.14 (0.05) *** 
 
0.14 (0.05) *** 
 
0.14 (0.05) *** 
Jul-Sept 
    
0.26 (0.05) *** 
 
0.26 (0.05) *** 
 
0.26 (0.05) *** 
Oct-Dec 
    
0.20 (0.05) *** 
 
0.20 (0.05) *** 
 
0.20 (0.05) *** 
County Unemployment 
    
0.06 (0.02) *** 
 
0.06 (0.02) *** 
 
0.06 (0.02) *** 
Absconding Status     -0.97 (0.09) ***  -0.97 (0.09) ***  
-0.96 (0.09) *** 
Number of Positive Substance Abuse Tests     0.03 (0.07)   
0.03 (0.07) 
  
0.04 (0.07) 
 Number of Arrests     -0.05 (0.09)   
-0.04 (0.09) 
  
-0.03 (0.09) 
 Discharge Status         -0.76 (0.06) ***   -0.76 (0.06) ***  -0.76 (0.06) *** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
               † Includes fixed effects 
               ˄ The coefficient and standard error for this term have each been multiplied by 10 
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the means of all covariates) of every additional two weeks in short-term custody on 
employment, which indicates that after approximately five weeks in short-term custody, 
there is no longer a significant effect of additional days in custody on the predicted 
probability of future employment. To illustrate this point, the table shows a snapshot of 
the marginal effects between days 36 and 38. The outlined box indicates that the decrease 
in the predicted probability of employment is significant through 37 days in short-term 
custody. After 37 days, there is not a significant marginal effect of additional custodial 
days on employment following release. 
Table 4.4. The Marginal Effects of Days in Custody on Employment 
  coef (SE)   
Days in Custody◇ 
   0 Days -0.58 (0.13) *** 
14 Days (2 weeks) -0.42 (0.09) *** 
28 Days (4 weeks) -0.25 (0.07) *** 
… 
   36 Days -0.16 (0.08) ** 
37 Days -0.15 (0.08) * 
38 Days -0.13 (0.08)  
… 
   42 Days (6 weeks) -0.09 (0.09) 
 56 Days (8 weeks) 0.07 (0.14) 
 70 Days (10 weeks) 0.23 (0.19) 
 84 Days (12 weeks) 0.40 (0.25)   
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 ◇ The coefficient and standard error for all terms have each been 
multiplied by 100 
 
An Exploration of Reciprocal Causality 
 
The results of the first two parts of the analysis suggest a relatively consistent story 
about the impact of short-term custody, wherein the experience of re-incarceration is 
detrimental to the ability of parolees to find employment following custodial sanctions. 
As discussed earlier, however, unemployment insurance data are limited in that they do 
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not provide the precise dates or duration of employment, offering only a binary indication 
of whether an individual maintained formal employment for at least one day in a given 
quarter. In turn, the temporal ordering of short-term custody and employment within a 
single quarter cannot be accurately identified. To investigate the potentially causal 
relationship between short-term custody and employment, the current analysis has 
attempted to define multi-quarter progressions of custody and employment that impose a 
temporal ordering such that short-term custody occurs prior to potential employment. 
Model 1 in Table 4.5 further builds on this causal story by exploring whether there is any 
basis for concern over reciprocal causality, or the predictive impact of employment on 
short-term custody. 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the final model, which is constructed using the logic 
followed in the fourth model in Table 4.2. Each custodial status variable used in Model 4 
in Table 4.2 is re-created for employment, such that employment is measured in quarters 
t-2, t-1, and t. By switching the independent and dependent variables, the lagged custody 
coefficient in this final model effectively isolates the impact of employment in quarter t-1 
on short-term custody in quarter t for people who did not experience any employment in 
quarters t-2 or t. As expected, the findings reveal a significant negative relationship 
between current employment status and custody status that is similar to the current 
custody coefficient in Model 4 in Table 4.2. These coefficients are similar because they 
reflect the association between custody and employment that occur in the same quarter, 
where the causal ordering is unclear. Most central to the causal story, the model indicates 
that lagged employment is not significantly associated with current short-term custody, 
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providing further support that reciprocal causality is not driving the relationship between 
re-incarceration and labor market outcomes. 
Table 4.5. Effect of Employment on Short-Term Custody 
  M1† 
 
coef (SE)   
Employment Characteristics 
   Employment Status -0.57 (0.07) *** 
1-Quarter Lagged Employment Status 0.02 (0.08) 
 2-Quarter Lagged Employment Status -0.08 (0.08) 
 1-Quarter Lag*Current Employment -0.21 (0.11) ** 
1-Quarter Lag*2-Quarter Lag 0.05 (0.11) 
 
 
  
 Time-Varying Characteristics   
 Quarters Since Release -0.04 (0.01) *** 
Seasonal Quarter (ref=Jan-Mar)   
 Apr-Jun -0.10 (0.05) * 
Jul-Sept -0.08 (0.05) 
 Oct-Dec -0.04 (0.05) 
 County Unemployment -0.04 (0.02) ** 
Absconding Status 0.81 (0.06) *** 
Number of Positive Substance Abuse Tests 0.12 (0.07) * 
Number of Arrests 0.36 (0.07) *** 
Discharge Status -1.24 (0.09) *** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   † Includes fixed effects 
       
Discussion 
 
Prior reentry research has consistently documented labor market challenges among 
former prisoners. Although some scholars have attributed these challenges to the 
experience of incarceration, this conclusion has been largely speculative since data 
limitations have precluded a rigorous inquiry into the causal nature of this relationship. In 
response, the current analysis uses three strategies to isolate the impact of incarceration 
on future labor market outcomes among parolees in Michigan: (1) selecting a sample of 
former prisoners who all have felony convictions; (2) controlling for unmeasured 
variation within and across individuals; and (3) imposing a quarterly structure on the data 
that allows for the temporal ordering of incarceration and employment. The paper 
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specifically examines re-incarceration in jails and other temporary custodial facilities – 
an experience previously neglected in research on incarceration and employment – and, 
as a result, advances prior literature on how prisoner reentry is shaped by the increasingly 
common use of short-term custody as a tool of parole supervision.  
The findings provide evidence that both the occurrence and duration of short-term 
custody shape labor market outcomes. Individuals on parole who experience re-
incarceration in temporary correctional facilities such as jails or detention centers 
experience a significant reduction in the likelihood of employment in the months during 
and following their incarceration. Spells of incarceration that occur in the quarter of 
measured employment as well as the quarter before measured employment are most 
detrimental to success in the labor market. The analysis also demonstrates that the 
duration of custody matters for future labor market outcomes. Increases in the length of 
quarterly custody between one day and approximately five weeks are associated with a 
significant decrease in the likelihood of employment in the following quarter. The 
marginal effects of re-incarceration diminish as the length of time spent in custody during 
a given quarter increases, and after the five week mark, additional days in custody during 
the quarter do not further reduce the likelihood of employment.  
The results offer preliminary evidence that the relationship between short-term re-
incarceration and future employment is causal. The analysis establishes this causal link in 
two ways. First, the models isolate the occurrence of custody in the quarter prior to the 
measurement of labor market outcomes. The results indicate that lagged custody – even 
in the absence of current custody – negatively affects the likelihood of employment. 
Second, the final model in the analysis reverses the causal question, showing that there is 
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not a significant relationship between lagged employment and current custody. Both of 
these approaches provide temporal support for the impact of short-term custody on 
employment. 
The results of the current analysis should be interpreted in light of several caveats that 
suggest next steps for research. First, more detailed data on the timing of labor market 
involvement could shed further light onto possible causality between short-term re-
incarceration and employment. Although the use of lagged custodial variables and 
interaction terms in the present analysis offers initial support for the causal effect of 
short-term custody on employment, data that directly identify the chronology of custodial 
spells and employment by using precise incarceration and employment dates would 
provide more robust evidence for the nature of the relationship between incarceration and 
engagement in the labor market. 
Subsequent research on the relationship between incarceration and employment could 
also more effectively establish causality through the inclusion of more time-varying 
individual-level variables. The current models include individual-level fixed effects and 
several time-varying variables related to employment, substance abuse, parole 
supervision, and arrest, but do not control for other time-varying measures that might 
contribute to either re-incarceration or struggles in the labor market. In order to 
effectively rule out the possibility that re-incarceration and employment challenges are 
both caused by a third unmeasured factor, future studies need to include more data on 
additional individual-level time-varying measures such as mental and physical health, 
involvement in offending behavior, or changing life circumstances such as marital status. 
Future studies would be also enhanced by utilizing a wider range of data on 
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employment outcomes. While the analysis of quarterly wages reported in Appendix C-2 
can serve as a proxy for duration of employment, the data utilized in this study are unable 
to identify the difference between a single day of work within a given quarter and 90 days 
of work within the same quarter. Data that include more comprehensive measures of the 
extent to which former prisoners are involved in the labor market would provide 
additional information on the nature of the relationship between short-term custody and 
employment. For instance, an employment continuum from economically adequate jobs 
to economically inadequate jobs (“underemployment”) to unemployment may better 
capture the labor market experiences of former prisoners in the reentry process than an 
employment-unemployment dichotomy (Clogg, Sullivan, & Mutchler, 1986; Dooley, 
Prause, & Ham-Rowbottom, 2000). Data from multiple states would also help resolve 
any concern over the generalizability of the findings related to jurisdictionally specific 
characteristics of labor markets or criminal justice systems. 
Finally, the study raises important questions about the process by which parole agents 
decide among potential sanctions for parole violators. In the current analysis, parolees 
who returned to prison were censored starting in the quarter of their return. As a result, 
the reported models illuminate the trajectories of parolees at risk of receiving either 
community-based sanctions or short-term custodial sanctions. However, based on the 
nature of the violation as well as individual and contextual-level characteristics of 
parolees, sanction decisions may often come down to a choice between short-term 
custodial sanctions and revocation, without consideration of a community-based option. 
In order to more comprehensively understand how the full range of agent decision-
making shapes employment outcomes, future research could censor parolees who are 
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issued community-based sanctions in an effort to assess the impact of different types of 
custodial outcomes on parolees. 
The findings of this study have important implications for policy and programming. 
Framed in the context of the literature on employment and desistance, the current analysis 
illustrates a paradox that shapes the post-release experiences of former prisoners as well 
as the interests of local communities and taxpayers. Although finding and maintaining 
employment has shown to play a central role in desistance (Hagan, 1993; Petersilia, et al., 
2007; Raphael, 2007; Sampson & Laub, 1993; Uggen, 2000), current sentencing 
practices used in the supervision of former prisoners can interfere with labor market 
success and, in turn, place former prisoners at higher risk for recidivism. Particularly 
popular as a sanction for parole violations, the use of short-term custody spells further 
entangles many former prisoners in the criminal justice system by creating obstacles to 
employment. For parole authorities concerned with the impact of issued sanctions on 
parolees’ risk of future recidivism, the analysis suggests that authorities not only consider 
adjusting the duration of re-incarceration but also investigate the possibility of utilizing 
alternatives-to-incarceration. Although shorter spells of short-term custody have less of 
an impact on future employment than longer ones, the benefits of reducing sanction 
lengths (at least with regard to labor market outcomes) diminish quickly. Exploring 
options other than custody may be more effective in setting parolees up for future success.  
The effective reformation of policy and practice will require additional inquiry into 
the precise mechanisms by which re-incarceration in temporary correctional facilities 
hinders gainful employment. For instance, how do parolees experience and manage the 
transition from short-term custody back to the community, specifically with regards to 
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their search for employment? How does the occurrence of short-term re-incarceration – 
as distinct from a previous prison spell –influence employer decision-making around 
hiring and maintaining the employment of former prisoners? Exploration of how and why 
short-term custody disrupts labor market success can facilitate the implementation of 
parole practices that more effectively support parolees through cycles of short-term 
incarceration. Equally importantly, policymakers, parole authorities, and service 
providers may benefit from the consideration of other approaches to post-prison 
supervision that do not include incapacitation and therefore do not pose as severe of a 
disruption to successful reentry.   
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CHAPTER 5  
Conclusion 
 
As a result of the incarceration epidemic that has plagued the United States for the 
last four decades, more than 2.2 million individuals are currently incarcerated in local, 
state, and federal jails and prisons. For most offenders, involvement in the correctional 
system is a recurrent experience, as over two-thirds of former prisoners experience a new 
arrest and one-half return to prison in the three years following their initial release from 
custody (Langan & Levin, 2002; The Pew Center on the States, 2011). Although some 
states have reported reductions in the past few years (The Council of State Governments, 
2012), the national recidivism rate has remained between 43 and 52 percent for the past 
three decades (Langan & Levin, 2002; The Pew Center on the States, 2011), generating a 
perpetual revolving door between prisons and communities.  
The “reentry recycling” (Clear, Waring, & Scully, 2005, p. 179) that results from 
prison’s revolving door has substantial implications for individuals, families, and 
communities. Prisoners tend to come from populations that are socially and economically 
disadvantaged, and the challenges to successful reentry posed by incarceration perpetuate 
individual-level inequalities (Visher & Travis, 2003; Western & Pettit, 2010). 
Disadvantaged neighborhoods, which lose more people to custody annually and have 
fewer foundational supports, also suffer more dramatically from the churning of residents 
through prison (Clear, 2007). In addition, the cycling of individuals through the 
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correctional system places a high burden on taxpayers who bear the financial and social 
cost of incarcerating repeat offenders (Ludwig, 2010) 
Research has suggested that high rates of recidivism have been fueled in part by the 
correctional system’s increased utilization of parole revocation, the return of parolees to 
prison for violating the conditions of their community supervision (Burke & Tonry, 2006; 
Grattet, et al., 2011; Petersilia, et al., 2007). Amidst overall rising rates of incarceration, 
the return of former prisoners to custody for parole violations represents a 
disproportionate increase in the share of prison admissions. (Travis, 2007). Yet despite 
the correctional system’s growing reliance on revocation as a “crucial back-end steering 
mechanism” that “play[s] a critical role in determining who will receive the harsher 
punishment of incarceration” (Simon, 1993, p. 12) scholars have only recently turned 
their attention to how the parole system maintains the revolving door between prison and 
community. 
In response, this dissertation provided a three-part exploration of how the issuance of 
violations and sanctions are influenced by the characteristics of parolees, their residential 
neighborhoods, and the context of their supervising parole offices, as well as how 
violations and sanctions, in turn, affect community reintegration following release from 
custody. To do so, each of the three analytic chapters utilized data on Michigan parolees 
to examine a different stage of recidivism. The first analytic chapter illuminated the 
relationship between neighborhood contextual conditions and offending behavior through 
an analysis of violation behavior and the filing of the violation report. The second 
analytic chapter investigated the impact of county contextual conditions on institutional 
responses to offending behavior through an assessment of the sanctions issued to parole 
  108 
violators. The final analytic chapter inquired into the implications of correctional 
sanctions for successful reentry through an examination of the impact of sanctions on 
parolees’ future labor market outcomes. 
Chapter 2, “The Role of Social Service Proximity in Prisoner Reentry” uses spatial 
mapping and multivariate analysis to examine the association between the local density 
of social services and the incidence of offending behavior as measured through the 
issuance of violation reports. The findings suggest that the impact of local social services 
on recidivism depends on how expansively one defines the “community” in which 
parolees reside. Parolees surrounded by a higher density of social services within 30 
miles of their homes are at lower risk for violation, but parolees living within close 
proximity to social services within five miles of their homes experience a higher risk of 
violation. It appears that services contribute to desistance as long as they are not located 
in a parolee’s immediate vicinity; services close enough to create local disorder or “holes 
in the resident-based fabric” are detrimental to parolees’ post-prison success. The results 
also indicate that parolees living in highly disadvantaged neighborhoods benefit more 
from local services than those living in less disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
This chapter offers several lessons to scholars and practitioners. From a research 
perspective, the findings emphasize the importance of utilizing multiple measures of 
service accessibility or – more broadly – of neighborhood context when considering the 
relationship between local conditions and recidivism. The findings also provide further 
motivation for researchers and policymakers to consider the role of ecological context in 
shaping recidivism among former prisoners. For parole agents and front line managers, 
this analysis underscores the importance of evaluating a wide range of factors when 
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approving parolees’ residences and pairing parolees with appropriate service providers, 
particularly for parolees living in disadvantaged neighborhoods. 
Chapter 3, “Institutional Sanctions in Context: The Impact of County-Level 
Characteristics on Parole Outcomes” examines the next stage in the cycle of recidivism, 
institutional responses to offending behavior. Building on prior evidence for the impact 
of local constraints and pressures on institutional decision-making, the analysis suggests 
two main findings. First, the contextual conditions that are typically considered “risky” – 
including less resource availability, more disadvantage, conservative politics, and a 
higher proportion of black residents – place parolees at higher risk for revocation to 
prison. Second, short-term custodial sanctions tend to be utilized by parole agents in 
counties fitting the following profile: fewer nearby service providers, less disadvantage, 
and a less conservative political culture. The results suggest that short-term custody 
functions not as an “intermediate” punishment between community-based sanctions and 
revocation but rather as a distinctive option utilized in certain areas. 
Although more research into the relationship between local context and front line 
decision-making is needed to identify specific recommendations for parole practices, the 
analysis of sanctions offers evidence that the experiences of parolees following 
noncompliant behavior are shaped by contextual characteristics of the jurisdiction in 
which they are supervised. State-level parole departments as well as local offices can use 
these findings to motivate further investigation into how their unique combinations of 
resources, demographics, and politics create local templates for the handling of parole 
violations. This knowledge can lead to evidence-based decisions about the utilization of 
parole sanctions to most effectively support offenders, communities and taxpayers alike.  
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Finally, Chapter 4, “The Effects of Short-Term Custodial Sanctions on Labor Market 
Outcomes Among Former Prisoners” assesses the impact of short-term custodial spells 
on employment to illuminate how the parole system perpetuates the revolving door 
between prisons and high-risk communities. The findings demonstrate that former 
prisoners who are re-incarcerated in short-term correctional facilities such as jails or 
detention centers experience a significantly lower likelihood of employment in the 
calendar quarter(s) during which they are incarcerated as well as the following quarter. In 
addition, the analysis suggests that the length of short-term incarceration, and not just its 
occurrence, matters for the ability of parolees to seek and maintain employment 
following release. The rigorous isolation of custodial spells temporally prior to 
employment provides support for the causal nature of the relationship between 
incarceration and future labor market outcomes. 
The results raise important questions about the usefulness of short-term custody as a 
sanction for former prisoners. Despite the prevalence with which short-term sanctions are 
issued to former prisoners, there has been a lack of research on the impact of such 
sanctions. Although these so-called “intermediate sanctions” are often touted as an 
effective alternative to longer-term prison spells, the present analysis offers evidence that 
short-term custody creates obstacles to the employment prospects of former prisoners. In 
addition to hindering the successful reintegration of individual offenders, the increased 
risk of unemployment following short-term custody also likely has broader implications 
for local communities and labor markets. The results suggest that short-term incarceration 
sustains the cycle of recidivism by producing additional challenges to successful reentry 
among former prisoners.  
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Taken together, the empirical chapters that compose this dissertation offer insight into 
the predictors and implications of recidivism among former prisoners. Although each 
investigation is relatively narrow in scope, the analyses take important steps in advancing 
reentry research while also illuminating key policy and practice considerations for 
stakeholders responsible for improving the fairness and efficacy of post-prison 
supervision. To inform specific recommendations for reform, additional research is 
needed to identify the specific mechanisms by which post-prison surveillance practices 
sustain the revolving door of prison and, in turn, perpetuate mass incarceration. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
Table A-1. Descriptive Statistics of Individual-Level Control Variables 
  Population (n=11,031)  # of Imputed Cases 
  
% (mean in 
italics) 
n (SD in 
italics)  % of pop n 
# Prior Prison Spells (ref=0) 
     0 0.48 (5244) 
 
0.00 (0) 1 0.27 (2962)  2 or 3 0.20 (2170) 
 4 or more 0.06 (655) 
 Years in prison, prior spell 2.94 (3.12) 
 
0.00 (15) 
Type of Offense (ref=Assaultive) 
     Assaultive offender 0.29 (3146) 
 0.00 (0) Drug offender  0.26 (2833) 
 Non-assaultive offender 0.46 (5052) 
 Sex offender 0.07 (814) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Substance Abuse History (ref=None) 
    None 0.51 (5619) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Alcohol only 0.04 (462) 
 THC only 0.08 (865) 
 Hard drugs only 0.05 (550) 
 Alcohol & THC 0.06 (714) 
 Hard drugs & alcohol/THC 0.26 (2821) 
 Known mental illness status 0.21 (2280) 
 
0.01 (76) 
Conditions of Release 
     Released on elec monitoring 0.08 (848) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Released to reentry center 0.10 (1122) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Year of release (ref=2003) 
     2000-2001 0.01 (110) 
 0.00 (0) 2002 0.06 (658) 
 2003 0.93 (10263) 
 Age (ref=51-89) 
     18-25 0.19 (2070) 
 
0.00 (0) 
26-30 0.17 (1843) 
 31-35 0.18 (2017) 
 36-40 0.16 (1772) 
 41-45 0.14 (1564) 
 46-50 0.10 (1064) 
 51-89 0.06 (701) 
 Education (ref=Some college or more) 
    8 years or less 0.07 (786) 
 
0.01 (123) 
Some high school 0.35 (3894) 
 GED 0.31 (3438) 
 High school graduate 0.20 (2227) 
 Some college or more 0.06 (686) 
 Female offender 0.08 (856) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Race (ref=White) 
     White 0.45 (4933) 
 0.00 (0) Black 0.53 (5900) 
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Other 0.02 (198) 
 Marital Status (ref=Married) 
     Never married 0.66 (7314) 
 0.00 (0) Married 0.12 (1365)  Divorced or separated 0.20 (2228) 
 Widowed, common law, unk 0.01 (124) 
 Number of dependents 1.24 (1.32) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Pre-prison employment 0.17 (1836)  0.14 (1512) 
a Denotes standardized variable 
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Table A-2. Effect of Nearby Services (5mi) on Log-Odds of Parole Violation 
(Individual-Level Controls) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
coef (SE)   coef (SE)   coef (SE)   
# Prior Prison Spells            1 0.64 (0.06) *** 0.65 (0.06) *** 0.64 (0.06) *** 
2 or 3 1.09 (0.07) *** 1.10 (0.07) *** 1.09 (0.07) *** 
4 or more 1.37 (0.13) *** 1.36 (0.13) *** 1.36 (0.13) *** 
Years in prison, prior spell -0.08 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.01) *** 
Type of Offense            Drug offender  -0.12 (0.06) * 
 
-0.12 (0.06) * 
 
-0.12 (0.06) * 
Non-assaultive offender 0.24 (0.06) *** 0.24 (0.06) *** 0.24 (0.06) *** 
Sex offender 0.21 (0.09) ** 
 
0.19 (0.09) ** 
 
0.19 (0.09) ** 
Substance Abuse History            Alcohol only 0.36 (0.11) *** 0.37 (0.11) *** 0.38 (0.11) *** 
THC only 0.34 (0.09) *** 0.33 (0.09) *** 0.33 (0.09) *** 
Hard drugs only 1.09 (0.13) *** 1.11 (0.13) *** 1.12 (0.13) *** 
Alcohol & THC 0.39 (0.10) *** 0.41 (0.10) *** 0.41 (0.10) *** 
Hard drugs & alcohol/THC 1.01 (0.06) *** 1.01 (0.06) *** 1.02 (0.06) *** 
Known mental illness status 0.19 (0.06) *** 0.18 (0.06) *** 0.18 (0.06) *** 
Conditions of Release            Released on elec. monitoring -0.33 (0.16) ** 
 
-0.35 (0.16) ** 
 
-0.35 (0.16) ** 
Released to reentry center -0.19 (0.17) 
  
-0.34 (0.17) ** 
 
-0.44 (0.17) ** 
Year of Release            2000-2001 -1.04 (0.25) *** -0.95 (0.25) *** -0.94 (0.25) *** 
2002 -0.35 (0.15) ** 
 
-0.32 (0.15) ** 
 
-0.32 (0.15) ** 
Age            18-25 1.42 (0.12) *** 1.43 (0.12) *** 1.43 (0.12) *** 
26-30 0.89 (0.11) *** 0.90 (0.11) *** 0.89 (0.11) *** 
31-35 0.83 (0.11) *** 0.84 (0.11) *** 0.83 (0.11) *** 
36-40 0.79 (0.11) *** 0.80 (0.11) *** 0.80 (0.11) *** 
41-45 0.77 (0.11) *** 0.77 (0.11) *** 0.77 (0.11) *** 
46-50 0.46 (0.11) *** 0.46 (0.11) *** 0.45 (0.11) *** 
Education (ref=Some college or more)           8 years or less 0.31 (0.12) ** 
 
0.33 (0.12) *** 0.32 (0.12) *** 
Some high school 0.33 (0.10) *** 0.33 (0.10) *** 0.33 (0.10) *** 
GED 0.45 (0.10) *** 0.44 (0.10) *** 0.44 (0.10) *** 
High school graduate 0.07 (0.10) 
  
0.07 (0.10) 
  
0.07 (0.10) 
 Female offender -0.32 (0.08) *** -0.29 (0.09) *** -0.30 (0.09) *** 
Race (ref=White)            Black 0.29 (0.05) *** 0.28 (0.06) *** 0.26 (0.06) *** 
Other -0.23 (0.17) 
  
-0.23 (0.17) 
  
-0.25 (0.17) 
 Marital Status (ref=Married)            Single 0.17 (0.07) ** 
 
0.17 (0.07) ** 
 
0.17 (0.07) ** 
Divorced or separated 0.30 (0.08) *** 0.29 (0.08) *** 0.29 (0.08) *** 
Widowed, common law, unk. 0.46 (0.24) ** 
 
0.47 (0.24) ** 
 
0.48 (0.24) ** 
Number of dependents 0.01 (0.02) 
  
0.02 (0.02) 
  
0.01 (0.02) 
 Pre-prison employment -0.13 (0.10) 
  
-0.13 (0.10) 
  
-0.13 (0.10) 
 cons -1.11 (0.15) *** -1.41 (0.17) *** -1.35 (0.17) *** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
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Table A-3. Effect of Distant Services (30mi) on Log-Odds of Parole Violation 
(Individual-Level Controls) 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
 
coef (SE)     coef (SE)     coef (SE)   
# Prior Prison Spells            1 0.63 (0.06) *** 
 
0.63 (0.06) *** 
 
0.63 (0.06) *** 
2 or 3 1.10 (0.07) *** 
 
1.09 (0.07) *** 
 
1.09 (0.07) *** 
4 or more 1.38 (0.13) *** 
 
1.35 (0.13) *** 
 
1.36 (0.13) *** 
Years in prison, prior spell -0.08 (0.01) *** 
 
-0.08 (0.01) *** 
 
-0.08 (0.01) *** 
Type of Offense            Drug offender  -0.14 (0.06) ** 
 
-0.13 (0.06) ** 
 
-0.13 (0.06) ** 
Non-assaultive offender 0.22 (0.06) *** 
 
0.22 (0.06) *** 
 
0.22 (0.06) *** 
Sex offender 0.18 (0.09) ** 
 
0.17 (0.09) * 
 
0.17 (0.09) * 
Substance Abuse History            Alcohol only 0.37 (0.11) *** 
 
0.40 (0.11) *** 
 
0.40 (0.11) *** 
THC only 0.36 (0.09) *** 
 
0.36 (0.09) *** 
 
0.36 (0.09) *** 
Hard drugs only 1.15 (0.13) *** 
 
1.14 (0.13) *** 
 
1.15 (0.13) *** 
Alcohol & THC 0.39 (0.10) *** 
 
0.42 (0.10) *** 
 
0.43 (0.10) *** 
Hard drugs & alcohol/THC 1.02 (0.06) *** 
 
1.02 (0.06) *** 
 
1.03 (0.06) *** 
Known mental illness status 0.17 (0.06) *** 
 
0.17 (0.06) *** 
 
0.17 (0.06) *** 
Conditions of Release            Released on elec. monitoring -0.30 (0.16) * 
 
-0.33 (0.16) ** 
 
-0.33 (0.16) ** 
Released to reentry center -0.08 (0.16) 
  
-0.29 (0.17) * 
 
-0.37 (0.17) ** 
Year of Release            2000-2001 -1.13 (0.25) *** 
 
-1.02 (0.25) *** 
 
-0.99 (0.26) *** 
2002 -0.38 (0.15) *** 
 
-0.34 (0.15) ** 
 
-0.34 (0.15) ** 
Age            18-25 1.34 (0.12) *** 
 
1.39 (0.12) *** 
 
1.39 (0.12) *** 
26-30 0.84 (0.11) *** 
 
0.88 (0.11) *** 
 
0.87 (0.11) *** 
31-35 0.81 (0.11) *** 
 
0.83 (0.11) *** 
 
0.83 (0.11) *** 
36-40 0.77 (0.11) *** 
 
0.80 (0.11) *** 
 
0.80 (0.11) *** 
41-45 0.75 (0.11) *** 
 
0.76 (0.11) *** 
 
0.77 (0.11) *** 
46-50 0.46 (0.11) *** 
 
0.46 (0.11) *** 
 
0.46 (0.11) *** 
Education (ref=Some college or 
more)   
  
  
  
  
 8 years or less 0.34 (0.12) *** 
 
0.32 (0.12) *** 
 
0.31 (0.12) ** 
Some high school 0.35 (0.10) *** 
 
0.32 (0.10) *** 
 
0.32 (0.10) *** 
GED 0.45 (0.10) *** 
 
0.43 (0.10) *** 
 
0.43 (0.10) *** 
High school graduate 0.06 (0.10) 
  
0.05 (0.10) 
  
0.05 (0.10) 
 Female offender -0.33 (0.08) *** 
 
-0.32 (0.09) *** 
 
-0.31 (0.09) *** 
Race (ref=White)            Black 0.44 (0.06) *** 
 
0.29 (0.06) *** 
 
0.28 (0.06) *** 
Other -0.22 (0.17) 
  
-0.26 (0.17) 
  
-0.27 (0.17) 
 Marital Status (ref=Married)            Single 0.20 (0.07) *** 
 
0.18 (0.07) ** 
 
0.18 (0.07) ** 
Divorced or separated 0.31 (0.08) *** 
 
0.30 (0.08) *** 
 
0.30 (0.08) *** 
Widowed, common law, unk. 0.50 (0.24) ** 
 
0.47 (0.24) ** 
 
0.48 (0.24) ** 
Number of dependents 0.01 (0.02) 
  
0.01 (0.02) 
  
0.01 (0.02) 
 Pre-prison employment -0.13 (0.10) 
  
-0.13 (0.10) 
  
-0.13 (0.10) 
 cons -1.17 (0.15) ***  -1.47 (0.17) ***  -1.46 (0.17) *** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B 
Table B-1. Descriptive Statistics of Individual-Level Control Variables 
  Distribution   # of Imputed Cases 
 
% (mean in 
italics) 
n (SD in 
italics) 
 
% n 
Year of release (ref=2003) 
     2000-2001 0.01 (46) 
 0.00 (0) 2002 0.05 (359) 
 2003 0.95 (7296) 
 Conditions of Release 
     Released on elec monitoring 0.06 (462) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Released to reentry center 0.08 (634) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Types of Violation 
     Technicalc 0.78 (6023) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Criminalc 0.22 (1678) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Reportingc 0.73 (5626) 
 
0.49  (3776) 
Residencec 0.50 (3853) 
 Conductc 0.03 (254) 
 Substance abuse testingc 0.18 (1420) 
 Associationc 0.29 (2262) 
 Firearmsc 0.03 (196) 
 Other weaponsc 0.29 (2205) 
 Employmentc 0.08 (578) 
 Sex offensed 0.09 (661) 
 Substance abused 0.51 (3957) 
 Programmingd 0.61 (4666) 
 Movement restrictiond 0.49 (3770) 
 Drivingd 0.22 (1658) 
 Financiald 0.03 (243) 
 Employmentd 0.02 (167) 
 Number of incidents in violation 2.82 2.85 
 
0.00 (0) 
Days between parole and violation 227.99 201.72 
 
0.00 (0) 
Absconder status 0.17 (1295) 
 
0.00 (0) 
# Prior Prison Spells (ref=0) 
     0 0.40 (3067) 
 0.00 (0) 1 0.29 (2264)  2 or 3 0.24 (1813) 
 4 or more 0.07 (557) 
 Years in prison, prior spell 2.58 (2.71) 
 
0.00 (9) 
Type of Offense (ref=Assaultive) 
     Assaultive offender 0.26 (1972) 
 0.00 (0) Drug offender  0.24 (1889) 
 Non-assaultive offender 0.50 (3840) 
 Sex offender 0.07 (571) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Substance Abuse History (ref=None)      None 0.43 (3286) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Alcohol only 0.04 (334) 
 THC only 0.08 (649) 
 Hard drugs only 0.06 (474) 
 Alcohol & THC 0.07 (539) 
 Hard drugs & alcohol/THC 0.31 (2419) 
 Known mental illness status 0.22 (1664) 
 
0.00 (54) 
Age (ref=51-89) 
     18-25 0.21 (1628) 
 0.00 (0) 26-30 0.16 (1237)  31-35 0.18 (1379) 
 36-40 0.16 (1255) 
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41-45 0.15 (1123) 
 46-50 0.09 (704) 
 51-89 0.05 (375) 
 Education (ref=Some college or more) 
     8 years or less 0.07 (544) 
 
0.01 (94) 
Some high school 0.35 (2717) 
 GED 0.35 (2669) 
 High school graduate 0.18 (1370) 
 Some college or more 0.05 (401) 
 Female offender 0.07 (540) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Race (ref=White) 
     White 0.43 (3321) 
 0.00 (0) Black 0.55 (4261) 
 Other 0.02 (119) 
 Marital status (ref=Married) 
     Never married 0.68 (5219) 
 0.00 (0) Married 0.11 (850)  Divorced or separated 0.20 (1542) 
 Widowed, common law, unk 0.01 (90) 
 Number of dependents 1.24 (1.32) 
 
0.00 (0) 
Pre-prison employment 0.13 (995)  0.10 (790) 
a Denotes standardized variable 
     b Measured at the regional level (30 miles from each of the 89 parole offices) 
c Denotes standard condition of supervision 
 d Denotes specialized condition of supervision 
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Table B-2. Impact of Context on the Log-Odds of Binary Sanction Outcomes 
(Individual-Level Controls) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
 Rev v. Non Rev  Cust v. Non Cust 
 (N=1535 v. N=6166)  (N=4134 v. N=3567) 
 
coef (SE)   coef (SE)  
Year of release (ref=2003)        2000-2001 -0.14 (0.63) 
  
0.02 (0.45) 
 2002 0.03 (0.28) 
  
-0.23 (0.19) 
 Conditions of Release        Released on elec monitoring -0.04 (0.30) 
  
-0.20 (0.20) 
 Released to reentry center -0.01 (0.29) 
  
0.22 (0.20) 
 Types of Violation        Reporting 0.05 (0.09) 
  
0.21 (0.06) *** 
Residence 0.19 (0.08) **  0.01 (0.06)  Conduct 0.01 (0.20) 
  
0.02 (0.16) 
 Substance abuse testing 0.02 (0.09) 
  
0.02 (0.07) 
 Association 0.07 (0.08) 
  
0.03 (0.06) 
 Firearms 0.12 (0.19) 
  
0.10 (0.18) 
 Other weapons 0.49 (0.08) ***  0.25 (0.07) *** 
Employment 0.03 (0.13) 
  
-0.19 (0.10) * 
Sex offense 0.64 (0.13) *** 
 
0.40 (0.11) *** 
Substance abuse 0.17 (0.09) **  -0.15 (0.06) ** 
Programming 0.09 (0.09) 
  
0.14 (0.06) ** 
Movement restriction 0.13 (0.08) 
  
0.06 (0.06) 
 Driving 0.20 (0.09) **  -0.03 (0.07)  Financial 0.11 (0.19) 
  
-0.18 (0.17) 
 Employment 0.26 (0.27) 
  
-0.16 (0.21) 
 Number of incidents in violation 0.09 (0.02) ***  0.27 (0.02) *** 
Days between parole and violation 0.02 (0.02)◇  
  
0.03 (0.01)◇  ** 
Absconder status 0.02 (0.12) 
  
0.71 (0.08) *** 
Criminal violation 2.01 (0.08) ***  1.13 (0.07) *** # Prior Prison Spells (ref=0)        1 0.72 (0.09) ***  0.23 (0.06) *** 
2 or 3 1.05 (0.11) ***  0.35 (0.08) *** 
4 or more 1.08 (0.16) ***  0.23 (0.12) * 
Years in prison, prior spell -0.04 (0.20)˄ 
  
-0.05 (0.01) *** 
Type of Offense (ref=Assaultive)        Drug offender  -0.49 (0.11) ***  -0.17 (0.08) ** 
Non-assaultive offender -0.42 (0.09) ***  -0.12 (0.07) * 
Sex offender 0.43 (0.14) ***  -0.20 (0.11) * 
Substance Abuse History (ref=None)        Alcohol only 0.03 (0.17) 
  
0.07 (0.13) 
 THC only 0.07 (0.13) 
  
-0.13 (0.10) 
 Hard drugs only -0.27 (0.15) *  0.12 (0.11)  Alcohol & THC -0.09 (0.15) 
  
0.01 (1.06)˄ 
 Hard drugs & alcohol/THC -0.11 (0.09) 
  
0.03 (0.06) 
 Known mental illness status 0.19 (0.09) **  0.05 (0.63)
˄ 
 Age (ref=51-89)        18-25 0.46 (0.21) **  0.09 (0.15)  26-30 0.30 (0.21) 
  
0.06 (0.14) 
 31-35 0.30 (0.20) 
  
0.17 (0.14) 
 36-40 0.31 (0.20) 
  
0.09 (0.14) 
 41-45 0.27 (0.20) 
  
0.11 (0.13) 
 46-50 -0.08 (0.21) 
  
-0.07 (0.14) 
 Education (ref=Some college or more)        8 years or less 0.30 (0.21) 
  
-0.12 (0.15) 
 Some high school 0.30 (0.17) *  0.04 (0.12)  
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GED 0.08 (0.17) 
  
0.03 (0.12) 
 High school graduate 0.22 (0.18) 
  
-0.07 (0.13) 
 Female offender -0.29 (0.17) *  -0.10 (0.10)  Race (ref=White)        Black -0.06 (0.09) 
  
0.04 (0.64)˄ 
 Other -0.03 (0.30) 
  
0.13 (0.21) 
 Marital status (ref=Never married)        Married -0.12 (0.12) 
  
0.09 (0.09) 
 Divorced or separated 0.08 (0.13) 
  
0.14 (0.10) 
 Widowed, common law, unk 0.24 (0.33) 
  
-0.02 (0.25) 
 Number of dependents -0.02 (0.03) 
  
-0.03 (0.02) 
 Pre-prison employment 0.19 (0.17) 
  
0.03 (0.12) 
 cons -4.52 (0.51) ***   -0.51 (0.34)  
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        ˄ The coefficient and standard error for this term have each been multiplied by 10   ◇ The coefficient and standard error for this term have each been multiplied by 100    
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Table B-3. Impact of Context on the Log-Odds of Fine-Grained Sanction Outcomes 
(Individual-Level Controls) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Revocation v. 
Short-Term Cust  
Short-Term Cust v. 
Community  
Revocation v.  
Community 
 (N=1535 v. N=2599)  (N=2599 v. N=3567)  (N=1535 v. N=3567) 
  coef (SE)   coef (SE)   coef (SE)   
Year of release (ref=2003)            2000-2001 -0.22 (0.67) 
  
0.10 (0.48)   -0.12 (0.68)  2002 0.16 (0.30) 
  
-0.25 (0.21)   -0.10 (0.30)  Conditions of Release            Released on elec monitoring 0.07 (0.32) 
  
-0.23 (0.22)   -0.16 (0.32)  Released to reentry center -0.11 (0.31) 
  
0.22 (0.21)   0.11 (0.31)  Types of Violation            Reporting -0.18 (0.10) *  0.26 (0.07) *** 0.08 (0.10)  Residence 0.17 (0.09) **  -0.03 (0.06)   0.14 (0.08) * 
Conduct 0.02 (0.22) 
  
0.04 (0.18)   0.02 (0.22)  Substance abuse testing -0.02 (0.10) 
  
0.05 (0.08)   0.03 (0.10)  Association 0.02 (0.09) 
  
0.03 (0.07)   0.05 (0.09)  Firearms 0.09 (0.21) 
  
0.05 (0.21)   0.13 (0.22)  Other weapons 0.41 (0.09) *** 0.10 (0.07)   0.51 (0.09) *** 
Employment 0.14 (0.14) 
  
-0.24 (0.11) **  -0.10 (0.14)  Sex offense 0.50 (0.15) *** 0.22 (0.13) *  0.72 (0.15) *** 
Substance abuse 0.26 (0.09) *** -0.21 (0.07) *** 0.05 (0.09) 
 Programming -0.03 (0.09) 
  
0.15 (0.06) **  0.12 (0.09)  Movement restriction 0.06 (0.09) 
  
0.06 (0.07)   0.12 (0.09)  Driving 0.24 (0.10) **  -0.12 (0.08)   0.12 (0.09)  Financial 0.22 (0.21) 
  
-0.27 (0.19)   -0.05 (0.21)  Employment 0.37 (0.30) 
  
-0.25 (0.23)   0.12 (0.29)  Number of incidents in violation 0.02 (0.02) 
  
0.26 (0.02) *** 0.29 (0.02) *** 
Days between parole and violation 0.01 (0.02)◇ 
  
0.03 (0.01)◇ *  0.03 (0.02)
◇ * 
Absconder status -0.38 (0.13) *** 0.78 (0.08) *** 0.40 (0.13) *** 
Criminal violation 1.89 (0.09) *** 0.26 (0.09) *** 2.14 (0.09) *** 
# Prior Prison Spells (ref=0)            1 0.70 (0.10) *** 0.06 (0.07)   0.76 (0.10) *** 
2 or 3 1.02 (0.12) *** 0.08 (0.08)   1.09 (0.11) *** 
4 or more 1.12 (0.18) *** -0.06 (0.13)   1.06 (0.17) *** 
Years in prison, prior spell 0.03 (0.02) 
  
-0.06 (0.02) *** -0.03 (0.02) 
 Type of Offense (ref=Assaultive)           Drug offender  -0.45 (0.12) *** -0.05 (0.08)   -0.50 (0.11) *** 
Non-assaultive offender -0.45 (0.10) *** -0.01 (0.07)   -0.42 (0.10) *** 
Sex offender 0.66 (0.16) *** -0.41 (0.13) *** 0.24 (0.15) 
 Substance Abuse History (ref=None)           Alcohol only -0.02 (0.19) 
  
0.07 (0.14)   0.05 (0.19)  THC only 0.18 (0.15) 
  
-0.20 (0.11) *  -0.02 (0.14)  Hard drugs only -0.40 (0.16) **  0.24 (0.12) **  -0.16 (0.17)  Alcohol & THC -0.12 (0.16) 
  
0.02 (0.12)   -0.10 (0.16)  Hard drugs & alcohol/THC -0.16 (0.10) *  0.08 (0.07)   -0.08 (0.09)  Known mental illness status 0.23 (0.09) **  -0.06 (0.07)   0.17 (0.09) * Age (ref=51-89)            18-25 0.47 (0.23) **  -0.04 (0.16)   0.43 (0.23) * 26-30 0.32 (0.23) 
  
-0.04 (0.16)   0.28 (0.22)  31-35 0.24 (0.22) 
  
0.10 (0.15)   0.34 (0.21)  36-40 0.30 (0.21) 
  
0.02 (1.47)˄   0.30 (0.21)  41-45 0.25 (0.21) 
  
0.03 (0.15)   0.28 (0.21)  46-50 -0.06 (0.23) 
  
-0.06 (0.15)   -0.12 (0.22)             
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Education (ref=Some college or more) 
8 years or less 0.44 (0.23) *  -0.25 (0.16)   0.18 (0.22)  Some high school 0.34 (0.19) *  -0.06 (0.13)   0.28 (0.18)  GED 0.08 (0.19) 
  
0.31 (1.30)˄   0.08 (0.18)  High school graduate 0.31 (0.20) 
  
-0.17 (0.14)   0.15 (0.19)  Female offender -0.26 (0.18) 
  
-0.05 (0.11)   -0.32 (0.17) * Race (ref=White)            Black -0.09 (0.10) 
  
0.03 (0.07)   -0.06 (0.10)  Other -0.15 (0.31) 
  
0.19 (0.22)   0.04 (0.32)  Marital status (ref=Never married)           Married -0.22 (0.13) *  0.17 (0.10) *  -0.05 (0.13)  Divorced or separated -0.01 (0.15) 
  
0.14 (0.11)   0.13 (0.14)  Widowed, common law, unk 0.31 (0.37) 
  
-0.12 (0.28)   0.19 (0.35)  Number of dependents 0.02 0.31)˄ 
  
-0.03 (0.02)   -0.03 (0.03)  Pre-prison employment 0.23 (0.19) 
  
-0.05 (0.13)   0.18 (0.17)  cons -3.63 (0.54) *** -0.21 (0.36)     -3.85 (0.53) *** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           ˄ The coefficient and standard error for this term have each been multiplied by 10 
◇ The coefficient and standard error for this term have each been multiplied by 100   
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Appendix C 
Table C-1. Descriptive Statistics of Time-Invariant  
Individual-Level Characteristics 
N=3,532 parolees % (mean in italics) n (SD in italics) 
Female offender 0.08 (273) 
Race 
  White 0.45 (1584) 
Black 0.53 (1876) 
Other 0.02 (72) 
Age 
  18-25 0.19 (659) 
26-30 0.17 (594) 
31-35 0.17 (620) 
36-40 0.17 (584) 
41-45 0.14 (479) 
46-50 0.10 (371) 
51-89 0.06 (225) 
Education 
  8 years or less 0.07 (257) 
Some high school 0.35 (1228) 
GED 0.31 (1074) 
High school graduate 0.20 (714) 
Some college or more 0.06 (216) 
Educational status unknown 0.01 (43) 
Marital Status 
  Married 0.12 (425) 
Never married 0.66 (2341) 
Divorced or separated 0.21 (724) 
Widowed, common law, unk 0.01 (42) 
Number of dependents 1.26 (1.31) 
Pre-Prison Employment 
  Employed in pre-prison 
quarter 0.05 (178) 
Unemployed in pre-prison 
quarter 0.82 (2884) 
Employment status unknown 0.13 (480) 
# Prior Prison Spells 
  0 0.48 (1707) 
1 0.26 (909) 
2 or 3 0.20 (705) 
4 or more 0.06 (211) 
Years in Prison, Prior Spell 
  Less than one year in prison 0.29 (1026) 
Between one and three years 
in prison 0.41 (1443) 
More than three years in 
prison 0.30 (1063) 
Prison time unknown 0.00 (10) 
Type of Offense 
  Assaultive offender 0.28 (982) 
Drug offender 0.26 (924) 
Non-assaultive offender 0.46 (1626) 
Sex offender 0.07 (260) 
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Known Mental Illness Status 
  No known mental illness 0.78 (2773) 
Known mental illness 0.21 (733) 
Mental illness status 
unknown 0.01 (26) 
Substance Abuse History  
 None 0.51 (1710) 
Alcohol only 0.04 (144) 
THC only 0.08 (268) 
Hard drugs only 0.05 (180) 
Alcohol & THC 0.06 (214) 
Hard drugs & alcohol/THC 0.26 (904) 
Early release (pre-2003) 0.05 (160) 
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Table C-2. Effect of Short-Term Custody on Quarterly WagesƱ 
  M1   M2†   M3†   M4† 
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
 
coef (SE)   
Custodial Characteristics 
               Current Custody Status -1.15 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.60 (0.05) *** 
 
-0.57 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.57 (0.06) *** 
1-Quarter Lagged Custody Status -0.88 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.40 (0.05) *** 
 
-0.36 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.33 (0.07) *** 
2-Quarter Lagged Custody Status 
            
-0.06 (0.06) 
 1-Quarter Lag*Current Custody 
        
-0.09 (0.09) 
  
-0.09 (0.09) 
 1-Quarter Lag*2-Quarter Lag 
            
-0.06 (0.10) 
 
                Time-Varying Characteristics 
               Quarters Since Release 
    
0.08 (0.01) *** 
 
0.08 (0.01) *** 
 
0.08 (0.01) *** 
Seasonal Quarter (ref=Jan-Mar) 
               Apr-Jun 
    
0.12 (0.04) *** 
 
0.12 (0.04) *** 
 
0.12 (0.04) *** 
Jul-Sept 
    
0.22 (0.04) *** 
 
0.22 (0.04) *** 
 
0.22 (0.04) *** 
Oct-Dec 
    
0.13 (0.05) *** 
 
0.14 (0.05) *** 
 
0.13 (0.05) *** 
County Unemployment 
    
0.06 (0.02) *** 
 
0.06 (0.02) *** 
 
0.06 (0.02) *** 
Absconding Status 
    
-0.64 (0.07) *** 
 
-0.65 (0.07) *** 
 
-0.66 (0.07) *** 
Number of Positive Substance 
Abuse Tests 
    
0.05 (0.07) 
  
0.05 (0.07) 
  
0.05 (0.07) 
 Number of Arrests 
    
-0.02 (0.08) 
  
-0.02 (0.08) 
  
-0.03 (0.08) 
 Discharge Status       -0.78 (0.06) ***  -0.77 (0.06) ***  -0.78 (0.06) *** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1              Ʊ The outcome variable "wages" is a measure of the natural log of total gross wages per quarter in 2010 dollars  
 † Includes fixed effects 
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Table C-3. Effect of Short-Term Custody on Poverty StatusƱ 
 
M1 
 
M2† 
 
M3† 
 
M4† 
 
coef (SE)   
coef (SE)   
coef (SE)   
coef (SE)  
Custodial Characteristics 
               Current Custody Status 1.38 (0.06) *** 
 
1.13 (0.09) *** 
 
1.14 (0.11) *** 
 
1.15 (0.11) *** 
1-Quarter Lagged Custody Status 0.94 (0.06) *** 
 
0.61 (0.09) *** 
 
0.61 (0.10) *** 
 
0.64 (0.12) *** 
2-Quarter Lagged Custody Status 
            
0.20 (0.09) ** 
1-Quarter Lag*Current Custody 
        
-0.03 (0.19) 
  
-0.03 (0.19) 
 1-Quarter Lag*2-Quarter Lag 
            
-0.16 (0.17) 
 
                Time-Varying Characteristics 
               Quarters Since Release 
    
-0.11 (0.01) *** 
 
-0.11 (0.01) *** 
 
-0.11 (0.01) *** 
Seasonal Quarter (ref=Jan-Mar) 
               Apr-Jun 
    
-0.05 (0.07) 
  
-0.05 (0.07) 
  
-0.05 (0.07) 
 Jul-Sept 
    
-0.22 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.22 (0.06) *** 
 
-0.22 (0.06) *** 
Oct-Dec 
    
0.06 (0.07) 
  
0.06 (0.07) 
  
0.06 (0.07) 
 County Unemployment 
    
-0.05 (0.02) ** 
 
-0.05 (0.02) ** 
 
-0.05 (0.03) ** 
Absconding Status 
    
0.69 (0.17) *** 
 
0.69 (0.17) *** 
 
0.69 (0.17) *** 
Number of Positive Substance 
Abuse Tests 
    
0.19 (0.11) 
  
0.19 (0.11) 
  
0.19 (0.11) 
 Number of Arrests 
    
0.07 (0.14) 
  
0.07 (0.14) 
  
0.08 (0.14) 
 Discharge Status 
    
0.86 (0.08) *** 
 
0.87 (0.08) *** 
 
0.88 (0.08) *** 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               Ʊ The outcome variable "poverty status" is a dichotomous indicator of whether a person's gross wages for each quarter 
 are below the poverty threshold for a single person under the age of 65, where 1=in poverty       † Includes fixed effects 
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